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**The Productivity Commission**

The Productivity Commission is the Australian Government’s independent research and advisory body on a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians. Its role, expressed most simply, is to help governments make better policies, in the long term interest of the Australian community.

The Commission’s independence is underpinned by an Act of Parliament. Its processes and outputs are open to public scrutiny and are driven by concern for the wellbeing of the community as a whole.

Further information on the Productivity Commission can be obtained from the Commission’s website (www.pc.gov.au).
Opportunity for further comment

You are invited to examine this draft and comment on it by written submission to the Productivity Commission, preferably in electronic format, by 3 June 2016. Further information on how to provide a submission is included on the inquiry website: http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/intellectual-property/make-submission

The Commission will be holding public hearings in June 2016. Likely locations for public hearings are Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne. Details regarding public hearings will be made available on the Commission’s website in due course.

The final report will be prepared after further submissions have been received and public hearings have been held, and will be forwarded to the Australian Government in August 2016.

Commissioners

For the purposes of this inquiry and draft report, in accordance with section 40 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998, the powers of the Productivity Commission have been exercised by:

Karen Chester    Commissioner
Jonathan Coppel  Commissioner
Terms of reference

INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS

I, Joseph Benedict Hockey, Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998, hereby request that the Productivity Commission undertake an inquiry into Australia's intellectual property arrangements, including their effect on investment, competition, trade, innovation and consumer welfare.

Background

Australia provides statutory protection for intellectual property through patents, trade marks, geographical indications, registered designs, plant breeders' rights, copyright, moral rights, performers' rights and circuit layout rights. Current laws are consistent with treaties under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Health Organization to which Australia has acceded, as well as bilateral and regional trade agreements.

The global economy and technology are changing and there have been increases in the scope and duration of intellectual property protection. The Australian Government seeks to ensure that the appropriate balance exists between incentives for innovation and investment and the interests of both individuals and businesses, including small businesses, in accessing ideas and products.

Scope of the inquiry

The Australian Government wishes to ensure that the intellectual property system provides appropriate incentives for innovation, investment and the production of creative works while ensuring it does not unreasonably impede further innovation, competition, investment and access to goods and services.

In undertaking the inquiry, the Commission should:

1. examine the effect of the scope and duration of protection afforded by Australia's intellectual property system on:
   (a) research and innovation, including freedom to build on existing innovation
   (b) access to and cost of goods and services
   (c) competition, trade and investment.
2. recommend changes to the current system that would improve the overall wellbeing of Australian society, which take account of Australia's international trade obligations, including changes that would:

(a) encourage creativity, investment and new innovation by individuals, businesses and through collaboration while not unduly restricting access to technologies and creative works

(b) allow access to an increased range of quality and value goods and services

(c) provide greater certainty to individuals and businesses as to whether they are likely to infringe the intellectual property rights of others

(d) reduce the compliance and administrative costs associated with intellectual property rules.

3. in undertaking the inquiry and proposing changes, the Commission is to have regard to:

(a) Australia's international arrangements, including obligations accepted under bilateral, multilateral and regional trade agreements to which Australia is a party

(b) the IP arrangements of Australia's top intellectual property trading partners and the experiences of these and other advanced economies in reforming their IP systems to ensure those systems meet the needs of the modern economy

(c) the relative contribution of imported and domestically produced intellectual property to the Australian economy, for example to Australia's terms of trade and other economic impacts of IP protection, including on inward investment

(d) the Government's desire to retain appropriate incentives for innovation and investment, including innovation that builds on existing work, and production of creative works

(e) the economy-wide and distributional consequences of recommendations on changes to the existing intellectual property system, including on trade and competition

(f) ensuring the intellectual property system will be efficient, effective and robust through time, in light of economic and technological changes

(g) how proposed changes fit with, or may require changes to, other existing regulation or forms of assistance (such as research subsidies) currently providing incentives for the development of intellectual property

(h) the findings and recommendations of the Harper Competition Policy Review in the context of the Australian Government's response, including recommendations related to parallel import restrictions in the Copyright Act 1968 and the parallel importation defence under the Trade Marks Act 1995

Process

The Commission is to undertake an appropriate public consultation process, inviting public submissions and releasing a draft report to the public.

The Final report is to be provided to the Government within 12 months of receipt of this Terms of Reference.

J B Hockey
Treasurer

[Received 18 August 2015]
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The full report is available at www.pc.gov.au
Acknowledgments

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The Commission is also grateful for the assistance it received from IP Australia in preparing this draft report. Staff from IP Australia facilitated access to the Intellectual Property Government Open Data (IPGOD) database and provided helpful responses to many questions about existing arrangements.

The Commissioners would like to express their appreciation to Dominique Lowe, who led the inquiry, and the team: Brendan Bourke, Anderson Cheung, Melissa Edwards, Elina Gilbourd, Pragya Giri, Suzana Hardy, Philip Harslett, Andrew Irwin, Ellie Jepsen, Paul Loke, Darren Magennis, Daniel Marshall, Aaron Morey, Silvana Moro, Adam Sheppard, Anthony Shomos, Anthony Smith, Leo Soames and Vernon Topp.
OVERVIEW
Key points

- Intellectual property (IP) arrangements need to balance the interests of rights holders with users. IP arrangements should:
  - encourage investment in IP that would not otherwise occur
  - provide the minimum incentives necessary to encourage that investment
  - resist impeding follow-on innovation, competition and access to goods and services.

- Improvements are needed so Australia’s copyright and patent arrangements function effectively and efficiently.

- Australia’s patent system grants protection too easily, allowing a proliferation of low-quality patents, frustrating the efforts of follow-on innovators, stymieing competition and raising costs to the community. To raise the quality of patents, the Australian Government should:
  - increase the degree of invention required to receive a patent, abolish the innovation patent, redesign extensions of term for pharmaceutical patents, limit business method and software patents, and use patent fees more effectively.

- Australia’s copyright system has progressively expanded and protects works longer than necessary to encourage creative endeavour, with consumers bearing the cost.
  - A new system of user rights, including the introduction of a broad, principles-based fair use exception, is needed to help address this imbalance.
  - Better use of digital data and more accessible content are the key to reducing online copyright infringement, rather than increasing enforcement efforts or penalties.

- While Australia’s enforcement system works relatively well for large rights holders, reforms can improve outcomes for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
  - Recent self-initiated reforms of the Federal Court, with an emphasis on lower costs and informal alternatives, should improve enforcement outcomes and replicate many of the benefits a dedicated IP court would offer.
  - Changes to the Federal Circuit Court are one option for improving dispute resolution options for small- and medium-sized enterprises.

- Commercial transactions involving IP rights should be subject to competition law. The current exemption under the Competition and Consumer Act is based on outdated views and should be repealed.

- Improving IP governance arrangements would help promote a coherent and integrated approach to IP policy development and implementation.

- Multilateral and bilateral trade agreements are the primary determinant of Australia’s IP arrangements. These agreements substantially constrain domestic IP policy flexibility.
  - An overly generous system of IP rights is particularly costly for Australia — a significant net importer of IP, with a growing trade deficit in IP-intensive goods and services.
  - The Australian Government should focus its international IP engagement on encouraging more balanced policy arrangements for patents and copyright, and reducing transaction and administrative costs for parties seeking IP rights in multiple jurisdictions.
  - Improving the evidence base and analysis that informs international engagement (especially trade agreements with IP provisions) would help the Australian Government avoid entering agreements that run counter to Australia’s interest.
Overview

1 The task at hand

What do we mean by intellectual property arrangements?

Intellectual property (IP), as defined by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), refers to:

… creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; symbols; names and images used in commerce. (2011, p. 2)

The main premise of IP arrangements is to ensure that creators of new and valuable knowledge are able to appropriate sufficient returns to motivate their initial investment. In this respect, they are not different from the property rights that apply to ownership of physical goods.

However, unlike the rights over physical goods, IP rights are not granted in perpetuity and there are limitations on their application. These limits recognise that the use of an idea by one party does not reduce its capacity for use by another, and that ideas provide economic and social value as other parties draw on existing knowledge to create their own. Since new ideas are a major source of economic growth, any defects in IP arrangements intended to encourage their creation and diffusion can be very costly.

IP rights take a variety of forms. The most familiar are patents, copyright and trade marks, but there are quite a few more, including rights over performances, designs, plant varieties and circuit layouts. A single product can embody many IP rights (figure 1).

IP rights in the broader innovation landscape

IP arrangements sit within a wider system, one where both policies and market-based arrangements influence innovation and the supply of creative works.

IP rights do not occupy a single ‘policy space’ in this landscape — their role differs depending on the right afforded. For example, patents can encourage product innovation, which can contribute to productivity growth. While other IP arrangements can improve wellbeing, they do not always do so through the avenue of improved productivity. For example, copyright can encourage the creation of new literary and artistic works, and design rights can lead to improvements in the look and feel of consumer products. Trade marks and geographical indications differ again, providing information and protecting brand reputation.
Today's smartphones are protected by over 1000 patents, including for their semiconductors, cameras, screens, batteries and calendars. Copyright protects the artwork and software within smartphones. Design rights protect the aesthetics, and the placement of cameras, buttons and screens. Circuit layout rights protect the electrical integrated circuits. Brands, logos and other distinctive marks such as 'iPhone' are protected by trade marks.

The role of IP rights in encouraging innovation also varies by sector and technology. In terms of patents, in some industries, such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals, they are central to firms’ business models. In contrast, in the software industry, some studies conclude that patents provide little, if any, boost to innovation. More generally, in industries where the speed of technological change is fast moving, innovators tend to rely more on market-based arrangements, such as first-mover advantage, than IP protection.

The role that IP rights play relative to other measures to encourage innovative and creative activity also varies. Governments provide a broad suite of policy measures such as tax concessions, grants, and in some cases, the direct provision of research and development including through Australian universities. In many cases, these policies are used in combination with IP rights.

Where IP rights are used in combination with other policies such as direct funding for research and innovation activities, they do little to encourage additional innovation. Rather, their use is intended to encourage the dissemination and commercialisation of inventions and they should be structured in a way that does not distort underlying research decisions. Open access repositories can further assist in the dissemination of ideas generated through publicly-funded initiatives.

What is the value of this review relative to previous reviews?

There has been a number of reviews of IP in Australia in recent years and some inquiry participants have questioned the need for yet another. However, previous reviews have focused on specific areas of IP, such as innovation patents, pharmaceutical patents, design protection, and copyright.

While the Commission has had regard to the recommendations and findings of these reviews, it has taken a more holistic perspective in order to identify ways that the IP system as a whole could be improved. A key benefit of this broader perspective is that it can facilitate a more consistent and coherent approach across the different IP rights. As
noted by the recent Competition Policy Review (the ‘Harper Review’), there has been ‘no overarching IP policy framework or objective guiding changes to IP protection’.

With the objective of maximising the wellbeing of the Australian community as a whole, the Commission has adopted an assessment framework based on four principles:

- **effectiveness** — that the IP system encourages the creation and dissemination of socially valuable ideas that would not have occurred (additionality)
- **efficiency** — that the incentives provided to encourage the creation of those socially valuable ideas is the minimum necessary
- **adaptability** — that the IP system adapts to changes in technology, and economic conditions
- **accountability** — that changes to the IP system are transparent and evidence-based and reflect community values.

The Commission has considered these principles against each of the elements of the IP system — how rights are assigned, used and enforced — in recognition that narrowly optimising only part(s) of the system may not deliver the best overall outcomes. The Commission has also had regard to the governance and institutional arrangements underlying IP policy development, decision-making and implementation.

**How well are IP arrangements working?**

While the function of IP is to encourage innovation and creative works, and to protect distinctive identities, establishing and enforcing IP rights comes with costs to consumers, other competitors and follow-on innovators.

Because IP rights give holders the ability to prevent others from using that IP, there is a risk the rights allow parties to unduly exercise market power. As noted by the Harper Review Panel in its recent report on competition policy, this can manifest in owners of IP rights extracting excessive royalties from IP licences or placing anticompetitive restrictions on knowledge dissemination, with adverse knock-on effects for innovation.

When innovation is cumulative, IP rights can reduce the flow of benefits from new ideas and processes. Indeed, overly strong restrictions on diffusion can be so detrimental to innovation that it can undo the benefits of the IP system in the first place:

… a poorly designed intellectual property regime — one that creates excessively “strong” intellectual property rights — can actually impede innovation. … Knowledge is the most important input into the production of knowledge. Intellectual property restricts this input; indeed, it works by limiting access to knowledge. (Stiglitz 2008, pp. 1694, 1710)

For countries that are net importers of IP, such as Australia (figure 2), costs to consumers and follow-on innovators from higher prices and restricted availability are not offset by increases in Australian producer profits.
Accordingly, IP policy should seek to balance the interests of rights holders and users, including follow-on innovators. However, as the terms of reference for this inquiry reveal, there are questions about whether the balance has shifted too far in favour of rights holders. This reflects longer-term trends in most advanced countries (including Australia) to expand the scope and term of IP protection.

As the balance has shifted, rights holders have responded to the system’s failings in strategic ways. Some are becoming defensive, amassing IP rights not to use them but to prevent others from doing so. Others, such as firms that use patents to create uncertainty for competitors, exploit the system’s shortcomings for their own gain. Ultimately, consumers lose out.

**What scope do we have to change IP arrangements?**

IP arrangements are not a tabula rasa. Indeed, many aspects of Australia’s IP arrangements have come about, or been strengthened, in order to give effect to commitments in international agreements. These agreements contain prescriptive obligations relating to key policy levers such as the duration and scope of protection — some of which are at odds with the public interest — and significantly curtail the Australian Government’s capacity to change domestic policy arrangements.

There are also practical constraints to independent IP policy-making. IP is a global commodity and Australia is a relatively small market. Raising the thresholds required for granting IP rights (such as increasing the inventive step required for a patent) above those...
applied in other countries risks innovations developed overseas not being made available in Australia.

While these constraints may see Australia fall short of achieving a balance across all aspects of IP arrangements, there is much we can do to progress IP reform. Doing so necessitates an approach that:

- sets out the overarching goals of IP arrangements
- examines opportunities for reform in areas not subject to international obligations
- advocates for multilateral change where the stakes are sufficiently high
- identifies change to institutional and governance arrangements that would promote better informed and more coherent policy outcomes in the future.

2 Patents — getting the fundamentals right

Ideally, the patent system would only grant patents to socially valuable innovations that would not otherwise occur. The granting of rights — and the strength of those rights — would strike a balance between incentives to innovate and the costs of patent protection.

Achieving such a balance has proven difficult in practice. Notwithstanding some important reforms that have helped to raise the bar on the quality of patents, the system remains tipped in favour of rights holders and against the interests of the broader community. Despite being a net importer of patented technology, Australia provides relatively strong patent rights compared to other countries.

Indeed, it appears to have become accepted wisdom that because patenting plays some role in promoting innovation, more and stronger patents are always better. But research reveals that greater patenting activity is not always associated with more innovation and that a non-trivial number of patented inventions have low social value, or would have occurred anyway.

Low-value patents impede innovation by frustrating the efforts of follow-on innovators and researchers. In some cases, low-value patents can be used as a strategic tool for stalling or excluding market entry, and can contribute to ‘patent thickets’, which potential market entrants must ‘hack’ their way through in order to compete in a particular technology space.

In seeking to rebalance the patent system, there is no single solution. In fact, the restrictive provisions in international agreements mean that there are now fewer policy options available. International agreements aside, seeking to directly enshrine key principles, such as additionality, would likely prove costly and arguably intractable. Nonetheless, the Commission has identified within these constraints a package of policy reforms that would collectively help to better target the patent system.
Introducing an objects clause

Consistent with the general lack of an overarching framework or objective to guide IP policy, the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (Patents Act) does not have an objects clause to guide legal interpretation. A number of stakeholders, both as part of this inquiry and other reviews, have argued that greater guidance is needed.

The Commission considers that clear specification of objectives is fundamental to policy implementation — particularly where there is scope for divergence between the intent of policy and the interpretation of legislative provisions. The introduction of an objects clause would provide much needed guidance.

An objects clause offers a number of benefits. Setting out the broad objectives of the Patents Act — and linking this to the patent criteria — would help laws remain adaptable and fit for purpose as new sectors and technologies emerge, and would be especially useful in underpinning decisions by IP Australia and the courts on whether to grant and uphold a patent. Currently, the courts are not required to consider factors that bear on whether granting a patent is in the public interest.

An objects clause should make clear that the principal purpose of the patent system is to enhance the wellbeing of Australians by providing protection to socially valuable innovations that would not have otherwise occurred, and by promoting the dissemination of technology. In so doing, the patent system should balance the interests of patent applicants and owners with the interests of users — including follow-on innovators, researchers and ultimately Australian society.

Reforming the inventive step

In and of itself, the introduction of an objects clause will not fully address low-quality patents. The criteria for granting patents are another mechanism for better targeting the patent system.

Inventions must meet five criteria to be afforded patent protection (box 1). Collectively these criteria serve as the ‘legislative gatekeeper’ for the quality of patents granted. The test for the inventive step is particularly important as it provides the closest proxy for an invention’s social value. Passing the test requires some advance over the prior art — that is, some contribution to knowledge in the relevant field of technology.

While elements of the inventive step were reformed as part of the 2012 Raising the Bar initiative, the minimum advance on the prior art required for an invention to be non-obvious and hence meet the test is still a ‘scintilla of invention’. The result of this low threshold for obviousness (which is lower than some comparable international jurisdictions), has been a multitude of low-value patents, which impose substantial costs on the community.
Box 1  What are the criteria for granting a patent?

IP Australia grants patents to inventions that meet various criteria outlined in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). To satisfy the criteria for a standard patent inventions must:

- be a ‘manner of manufacture’ — described by the courts to be an invention that involves human intervention to achieve an end result and has an economic use
- be novel — the invention must be novel in light of ‘prior art information’ (information about the current state of technology)
- involve an inventive step — the invention must not be obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art in light of ‘common general knowledge’ (knowledge of a worker in the field). A ‘scintilla of invention’ is enough for there to be an inventive step
- be useful — there must be a specific, substantial and credible use for the invention disclosed in the description of the invention
- have not been secretly used — the invention cannot be used before the priority date, which is the date from which a patent application is assessed against the patent criteria (usually the date when a party first files an application).

The Commission considers that the case for raising the obviousness threshold for meeting the inventive step is compelling. Increasing the required quantum of advance over the prior art would help ensure that patented inventions have sufficient social value such that the benefits of patent protection are more likely to outweigh the costs.

Given most patented inventions are developed for commercialisation in multiple countries, there is unlikely to be any benefit from Australia having a lower obviousness threshold than applied in larger consumer markets for technology such as Europe and the United States. As such, the obviousness threshold should at least be set at the level applied in these larger markets. The Commission’s preferred option is to amend the inventive step by borrowing from the (much simpler) wording employed by the European Patent Office — an invention should be taken to involve an inventive step if, having regard to the prior art base, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art. This would shift the focus of the test away from the quantitative ‘scintilla of invention’ concept toward more qualitative considerations and thus better quality patents.

Even if Australia’s inventive step were aligned with that of the European Union, from a global perspective the overall threshold for meeting the test (which depends on a broader range of factors than just the threshold for obviousness) would still likely be below the optimal level. Efforts to further increase the threshold for granting a patent, above the level that applies in larger consumer markets for technology, are best pursued multilaterally. Australia should advocate, in multilateral fora, for a higher threshold.
Improving the evidence base for granting patents

Since patent protection can impose costs on the community, judgements about whether or not to grant a patent must be well informed. A patent examiner draws on a significant amount of information when deciding whether to grant a patent, including information relevant to the current state of technology. In some cases, a patent applicant will have a better understanding of such factors.

There are several options for overcoming the information asymmetry between patent applicants and examiners. These involve better isolating and identifying the inventive concept for which the applicant is claiming protection. They include:

- seeking information on the state of the prior art. One option already employed in the European Union is to request applicants to specify their claims in two parts — the prior art that is relevant to the specific claim and the features of the invention that add to the prior art
- requiring applicants to explain why their invention is non-obvious.

While there is merit in eliciting better information to inform judgements about whether or not to grant a patent, requiring further information would impose an extra burden on applicants. The Commission is seeking information from inquiry participants on how best to balance these competing effects.

Tailoring the strength of patent rights

In addition to the binary choice about whether or not to grant a patent, there is the equally important consideration of ‘how much’ patent protection to offer. The extent (or strength) of patent protection afforded is influenced by a number of factors, including the duration of term, allowed number of claims, and the nature of legal protections available.

For many innovations, the strength of patent rights is excessive and imposes costs on the community with no offsetting benefits. Many patented inventions require less than 20 years of protection (based on renewal data, only around 15 per cent of standard patents reach their full term) and there is evidence that claims are being cast too widely and are being used for strategic purposes (figure 3).
While international agreements constrain (to an unfortunate degree in some cases) the policy levers that can be used to influence patent strength, policy makers are not devoid of options. One policy lever is the fees charged to patent applicants and patent holders. Research suggests fees can work to constrain the length and breadth of protection, as well as address strategic behaviour by patent holders.

At present, annual renewal fees increase in three stages across the life of a standard patent and applications with more than 20 claims incur a flat fee for each additional claim. In contrast, the United Kingdom has adopted a higher and more steeply increasing schedule of renewal fees, while Japan and South Korea charge an additional fee for every claim. Patent fees can be better deployed to discourage inventions utilising the full 20 year term and rights holders casting claims too broadly.

- Higher renewal fees later in the term of a patent would reduce economic rents that arise from patent holders unduly exercising market power, as well as the risk of patents being resurrected and reinterpreted to cover technology that was not originally contemplated.

- Higher claim fees would help to limit the costs of patent protection by making it harder for patent holders to extend the breadth of claims beyond what is needed to promote innovation, and a more pronounced escalation in claim fees could reduce incentives to use the system strategically.
While Australia should act unilaterally to make greater use of patent fees to help ensure that patent holders are not overcompensated, and to limit the cost of patent protection, international cooperation on fee setting would further increase the benefits of doing so.

3 Reforms in other parts of the patent system

The ‘second-tier’ patent experiment has failed

In addition to standard patents, Australia has a (second-tier) innovation patent system (IPS). The system’s objective (and that of comparable systems overseas) is to promote innovation by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Australia’s IPS is little used. In 2014, innovation patents made up just over 5 per cent of patents in force. The vast majority of parties that use the IPS do so only once.

The IPS was introduced in response to concerns that the previous petty patent system was not meeting the needs of firms (especially SMEs) who invested in ‘incremental innovations’. Reflecting this, the ‘innovative step’ required to receive an innovation patent is lower than the inventive step for standard patents — which itself only requires a ‘scintilla’ of invention. Innovation patents have been found valid by the courts, even where they apply to obvious contributions.

The low innovative threshold has proven more harmful than helpful, including (perversely) for SMEs. It has encouraged a non-trivial number of low-value patents, which in turn has reduced the credibility that patents provide for attracting necessary finance for commercialisation, and created uncertainty for other innovators. There is also evidence that innovation patents can be used strategically, either to target alleged infringers of standard patents or to frustrate entry by would-be competitors.

Some stakeholders have called for the IPS to be abolished; others have called for its reform. Were the IPS to be reformed, there would be strong grounds for setting the innovative threshold at the same level as the inventive threshold for standard patents, to exclude obvious inventions. It would also be necessary to address strategic behaviour, most likely by reintroducing a mandatory examination process, and limiting the period in which damages could apply. These changes would diminish the cost advantages of using the IPS, and see the IPS resemble the petty patent system — an approach already found to be lacking. The Commission’s view is that the IPS should be abolished.

Pharmaceuticals — a more nuanced policy prescription

The pharmaceutical industry relies on patents more than most. A significant investment in R&D is required to successfully develop pharmaceutical products. But once brought to market, absent IP protection, products can be readily copied by competitors.
In addition to ‘standard’ patent protection, the pharmaceutical sector benefits from other specific IP arrangements.

- Further to the 20-year term applying to all patents, pharmaceutical patents can qualify for an additional five years of protection. Extensions of term (EoT) are capped at an effective market life of 15 years.

- The data submitted in support of regulatory approval processes are also protected for a period of five years. Manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals seeking to enter the market during the period of data exclusivity must independently test and prove that their pharmaceuticals are safe and effective, even though their products are chemically identical to those of previously approved drugs.

Extensions of term — getting the duration right

Australia’s EoT scheme was intended to attract pharmaceutical R&D investment to Australia and to provide an effective market life for pharmaceuticals more in line with other technologies. (The latter objective reflects the fact that pharmaceuticals must go through extensive regulatory approval processes that can be subject to delay.)

A decade and a half on, it is clear that EoTs have been ineffectual in attracting pharmaceutical investment to Australia. There was no notable (above trend) increase in investment following the introduction of the scheme. Australia represents only 2 per cent of the global pharmaceutical market and a meagre 0.3 per cent of global pharmaceutical R&D. Instead, by precluding manufacture for export, EoTs have limited the opportunities for Australian-based generic firms from servicing third markets.

Moreover, rather than focussing on delay caused by the regulator, EoTs are calculated so as to compensate firms for being slow to introduce drugs to the Australian market. As a result, more than half of new chemical entities approved for sale in Australia enjoy an extension in patent term, and consumers and governments (ultimately taxpayers) bear higher prices for medicines. Calculations undertaken for the recent Pharmaceutical Patents Review indicated that EoTs cost the Australian Government and consumers over a quarter of a billion dollars each year.

Even within the constraints imposed by international obligations, there is scope for a more sophisticated approach when determining EoT. Extensions should only be allowed where the actions of the regulator result in an unreasonable delay. Timeframes (of around one year) set by the Australian Government for the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) provide a ready benchmark for determining what constitutes a reasonable processing period — EoT should only be granted where the time taken by the TGA exceeds this period. Further, EoTs should be provided as bespoke rights so as to allow manufacture for export during the extension period.
Moving away from data protection and towards greater data sharing

As distinct from patents, data protection arrangements are intended to protect the investment in the test data that is required in order to demonstrate that pharmaceuticals are safe and effective. Investments in test data can be substantial, with just under half of pharmaceutical development costs spent on clinical trials.

There have been ongoing claims, including throughout this inquiry, that patents alone do not provide sufficient protection and that data protection is necessary to allow manufacturers the opportunity to recover costs associated with introducing a new drug onto the market. Concerns about the sufficiency of patent protection are particularly pronounced for biologics — a category of treatments derived from living organisms.

With data protection increasingly seen as an insurance policy for pharmaceutical companies, the Australian Government has come under pressure to extend the duration of data protection. Most recently, negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement saw calls to extend data protection for biologics from 5 to 12 years, which the Australian Government rejected (data protection for biologics remains at 5 years).

Despite claims of inadequate patent protection having been advanced for a decade, there is little evidence of a problem. Even if isolated cases were verified as genuine issues, extending protection to a broad class of products to address exceptional cases would be a blunt response.

Not only is there a lack of evidence that patents are not doing the job, using data protection as a proxy for patent protection has drawbacks. Beyond the obvious absence of disclosure of information to promote further innovation, data protection lacks other important balances that apply to patents. Data protection is an automatic right, and so is not assessed for validity by an examiner, and cannot be challenged in court.

There are strong grounds for resisting further calls to extend the period of data protection, for both traditional pharmaceuticals and biologics. Indeed, rather than restrict the availability of data, there is a case for making data more widely available. At present, not only are follow-on manufacturers prevented from relying on clinical data for a period of 5 years, the data is kept confidential indefinitely. The Pharmaceutical Patents Review considered that allowing researchers access to this data could provide substantial public health benefits. The Commission too sees substantial merit in eventual publication of the data (after the relevant patent and any extensions have expired).

But doing so unilaterally would not be without downsides. Companies may respond by delaying the release of medicines in the Australian market. Accordingly, any moves to publish the relevant data need to be internationally coordinated. As in other areas of IP, such initiatives are best pursued through multilateral fora.
Reducing the scope for strategic behaviour

The ability of companies to leverage their IP rights to forestall entry by generics has a direct and significant impact on their profitability. Reviews that have examined the use of IP rights by pharmaceutical manufacturers, both here and overseas, suggest that firms use a variety of instruments to further extend the commercial life of their products. Two such strategies are so-called ‘evergreening’ and ‘pay-for-delay’.

Evergreening refers to the strategy of obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of the same product, typically by obtaining patents on improved versions of existing products. Some of these patents relate to genuine improvements that increase consumer wellbeing — such as significantly reducing the side effects of existing treatments. However some ‘improvements’ may involve slightly different chemical combinations or production processes, but show no appreciable difference to the end user. An additional benefit of changing the inventive step (as discussed above) is that it would likely reduce the scope for the latter type of behaviour — by granting new patents only for genuinely new products.

Pay-for-delay refers to the practice whereby patent holders pay generic manufacturers, as part of a settlement for a patent infringement case, to keep their products off the market for longer. Delays of this kind limit competition by restricting the number of products on the market and any subsequent price reductions. Delayed entry also has the effect of postponing any regulatory price drops (such as those triggered under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme).

Pay-for-delay settlements are well known within the United States and Europe. To date, there is scant evidence of such agreements in Australia — although this may in part be due to the difficulty of detecting suspect transactions, and assigning anticompetitive intent to them.

The Australian Government should introduce a transparent reporting and monitoring system to detect pay-for-delay settlements. Such arrangements monitored by the ACCC would require reporting of any arrangements between originator and follower pharmaceutical companies that affects the timing of market entry for a generic version of a product into the Australian market. As in other areas of this inquiry, the Commission is mindful of compliance costs and is seeking further feedback on how to ensure reporting arrangements are effective, while at the same time minimising compliance costs for firms.

Patents for business methods and software are inefficient and unnecessary

Software has become a pervasive component of many everyday goods and services and its development is increasingly taking place beyond the traditional software sector. Innovations in business methods are equally widespread — around one fifth of firms introduce organisational or operational processes in a given year.
The nature of innovation in business methods and software means that it does not fit neatly within the legal constructs that underpin the IP system. In order to be patentable, an invention must be a ‘manner of manufacture’ — a concept that stems from England’s 1624 Statute of Monopolies. Unsurprisingly, the use of a four century old definition in the field of technology has proven challenging to apply to contemporary innovations.

Over time, the courts have expanded the definition of patentable subject matter to include some business methods and software (BM&S). But there is pressure by some to expand the definition further, and this has led to ongoing legal controversy and court action in Australia and elsewhere. Clarification through reform, guided by an economic framework, rather than incremental legal interpretation is needed.

In economic terms, there is little justification for patent protection for BM&S. Business methods typically lack the large fixed cost component of traditional patentable products. Patent protection is therefore less likely to procure additionality. Other forms of protection, such as confidentiality and trade secrets may be sufficient and more targeted. For software, shortening development cycles (typically around 5 years and in some cases much less) mean the traditional patent term of 20 years is anachronistic, excessive and inefficient. The importance of incremental innovation and learning by sharing mean that locking up a branch of software development for 20 years can hinder future product development, reducing consumer choice and welfare.

The nature of software markets, the costs of development and the presence of other incentives to innovate collectively make a strong case that BM&S should not be eligible for patent protection. Broader changes to patents, particularly around the inventive step and abandoning innovation patents, may knock out a large share of BM&S patents. Nonetheless, there is value in making clear that BM&S should not be considered patentable subject matter.

4 Copy(not)right

Copyright is an important IP right that protects the material expression of literary, dramatic, artistic and musical works, as well as books, photographs, sound recordings, films and broadcasts. Copyright grants creators the exclusive right to reproduce their work in material form, as well as to publish, perform in public, communicate to the public, and adapt their work. Exercise of these rights is commonly licenced to intermediaries, such as publishers, record companies, film studios, broadcasters, and copyright collecting agencies.

However, Australia’s copyright arrangements are weighed too heavily in favour of copyright owners, to the detriment of the long-term interests of both consumers and intermediate users. Unlike other IP rights, copyright makes no attempt to target those works where ‘free riding’ by users would undermine the incentives to create. Instead, copyright is overly broad; provides the same levels of protection to commercial and non-commercial works; and protects works with very low levels of creative input, works
that are no longer being supplied to the market, and works where ownership can no longer be identified.

Copyright term is excessive and imposes costs

Copyright protects literary, musical, dramatic and artistic works for the duration of the creator’s life plus 70 years. Following publication, sound recordings and films are protected for 70 years, television and sound broadcasts for 50 years, and published editions for 25 years. To provide a concrete example, a new work produced in 2016 by a 35 year old author who lives until 85 years will be subject to protection until 2136.

The evidence (and indeed logic) suggests that the duration of copyright protection is far more than is needed. Few, if any, creators are motivated by the promise of financial returns long after death, particularly when the commercial life of most works is less than 5 years.

Overly long copyright terms impose costs on the community. Empirical work focussing on Australia’s extension of copyright protection from life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years (a requirement introduced as part of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement) estimated that an additional 20 years protection would result in net transfers from Australian consumers to foreign rights holders of around $88 million per year. But these are likely to be a fraction of the full costs of excessive copyright protection. The retrospective application of term extension exacerbates the cost to the community, providing windfall gains to copyright holders with no corresponding benefit.

Other costs are harder to quantify. Long periods of copyright protection, coupled with automatic application and no registration requirements, results in many works being ‘orphaned’ — protected by copyright but unusable by libraries, archives and consumers because the rights holder cannot be identified. Many other works are also unavailable to consumers once outside of their window of commercial exploitation.

A number of studies have attempted to estimate a duration of protection where the benefits to holders are matched by the costs to users. These studies find that a term of around 25 years enables rights holders to generate revenue comparable to what they would receive in perpetuity (in present value terms), without imposing onerous costs on consumers.

A new system of user rights

The limited exceptions to the exclusive rights granted to creators under Australia’s copyright law do little to restore the balance.

Exceptions operate as a defence for acts that would otherwise be an infringement of a creator’s exclusive rights. At a high level, Australia allows ‘fair dealing’ in copyright material; time- and format-shifting of copyright material; libraries, archives and other cultural institutions to preserve and disseminate works, particularly in the digital era; and
the operation of some technology processes. These exceptions are too narrow and prescriptive, do not reflect the way people actually consume and use content in the digital world, and are insufficiently flexible to account for new legitimate uses of copyright material.

Consistent with the recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission in 2013, the Commission is recommending Australia’s current exception for *fair dealing* be replaced with a broader US-style *fair use* exception. Such an approach would see copyright better target those works where ‘free riding’ by users would undermine the economic incentives to create and disseminate works. The fair use exception should be open ended and based on a number of fairness factors, which the courts would consider when testing whether a use of copyright material interferes with the normal exploitation of the work. These should include the:

- effect of the use on the market or value of the copyright protected work at the time of the use
- amount, substantiality or proportion of the work used, and the degree of transformation applied to the work
- existing commercial availability of the work
- purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is commercial or private.

One of the key advantages of a fair use over a fair dealing exception is that the law can adapt to new circumstances and technologies. Under a fair dealing exception, legislative change is required to expand the categories of use deemed to be fair. In contrast, under fair use, courts have the latitude to determine if, on the facts, a new use of copyright material is fair.

Not surprisingly, submissions to this inquiry from participants currently benefiting from copyright protection universally argued against the adoption of fair use in Australia. Many participants suggested that by design, fair use is imprecise on the permissible uses of copyright material, and its adoption would create significant legal uncertainty for both rights holders and users. Putting the decision about which uses are fair in the hands of the court system necessitates litigation to determine the scope of infringements. Given the time and cost such court action entails, both rights holders and users might face some, at least initial, uncertainties about the degree of protection afforded to new uses.

In the Commission’s view, legal uncertainty is not a compelling reason to eschew a fair use exception in Australia, nor is legal certainty desirable in and of itself. Courts interpret the application of legislative principles to new cases all the time, updating case law when the circumstances warrant doing so.

To reduce uncertainty, the Commission is recommending Australia’s fair use exception contain a non-exhaustive list of illustrative uses, which provides strong guidance to rights holders and users. Existing Australian and foreign case law, particularly from the United States where fair use has operated for some time, will provide further guidance on what constitutes fair use.
Participants currently benefiting from copyright protection also argued fair use will significantly reduce the incentive to create and invest in new works, industry profitability and employment. The Commission considers that industry perspectives on the costs are overstated and premised on flawed assumptions. Further, most new works consumed in Australia are sourced from overseas and their creation is unlikely to be responsive to changes in Australia’s fair use exceptions. In the Commission’s view, enacting a fair use provision would deliver net benefits to Australian consumers, schools, libraries, cultural institutions and the broader community.

Making it easier for users to access legitimate content

Timely and cost-effective access to copyright-protected works — be they movies, television programs or electronic games — is the best way for industry to reduce online copyright infringement. Therefore, in addition to implementing a new exception for fair use, the Commission is recommending further changes to Australia’s copyright arrangements to make it easier for users to access legitimate copyright-protected content.

Geoblocking restricts a consumer’s access to digital products, enabling rights holders and intermediaries to segment the Internet into different markets and charge different prices (or offer different services) to consumers based on their location.

The use of geoblocking technology is pervasive, and frequently results in Australian consumers being offered a lower level of digital service (such as a more limited music or TV streaming catalogue) at a higher price than in overseas markets. Studies show Australian consumers systematically pay higher prices for professional software, music, games and e-books than consumers in comparable overseas markets. While some digital savvy consumers are able to avoid these costs (such as through the use of proxy servers and virtual private networks), many are relegated to paying inflated prices for lower standard services.

The Australian Government should make clear that it is not an infringement of Australia’s copyright system for consumers to circumvent geoblocking technology and should seek to avoid international obligations that would preclude such practices.

Parallel import restrictions on books are the analogue equivalent of geoblocking. Numerous reviews, including by the Commission, and most recently by the Harper Review of Competition Policy, have recommended that prohibitions on parallel imports be repealed. The Australian Government recently supported the removal of the restrictions and has agreed to progress this reform subject to the findings of this inquiry. There is no new evidence that changes the case for removing the remaining restrictions on parallel imports of books. The Commission is recommending the repeal of the restrictions take effect no later than the end of 2017.
5 Protecting distinctive identities

Australia’s IP arrangements also include provisions for firms to protect their distinctive identity. These can encourage investment in the quality of goods and services, and thereby reduce the search costs faced by consumers as they seek to identify reputable products. Protections are available for the physical features of products (designs), their branding or styling (trade marks), and over claims of where and how they were produced (geographical indications).

Registered designs

Registered design rights serve a niche role in Australia’s IP rights system — protecting the appearance of products that have an industrial or commercial use.

Stakeholders have expressed various concerns with Australia’s design rights system, including low uptake of design rights, lack of harmonisation with design laws in other countries, lack of adaptability to changes in technological and industry practices, and lack of evidence that design rights generate net benefits to Australia. Despite the deficiencies of Australia’s registered design system, there is no superior alternative, and international agreements oblige Australia to provide at least some protection for industrial designs.

Given these constraints, the Commission has examined options for improving the existing registered design system. One potential reform raised by participants is joining the Hague Agreement. Doing so would allow designers to seek protection in a number of countries through a single international application, but would also involve extending the term of protection for registered designs from 10 to 15 years.

Australia is already committed to making ‘best efforts’ to join the Hague Agreement. Given the limited use of the agreement globally, the difficulty of reversing international commitments, and past examples of poor IP outcomes arising from international obligations, before deciding to join the Agreement, the Australian Government should assess the costs and benefits of doing so. This would help to ensure that the interests of Australian consumers (as opposed to only rights holders) are adequately considered, and that the gains from ‘harmonisation’ outweigh the costs of extending term.

Trade marks

Trade marks are a form of IP right that help consumers by making it easier to find goods and services by particular providers. They also provide an incentive for businesses to build and maintain a positive reputation. But, when trade marks are applied too broadly, they can frustrate new firms entering the market by making branding difficult — an outcome known as ‘cluttering’.
These difficulties have been exacerbated by legislative change, which has broadened the ‘presumption of registrability’ for those seeking trade mark protection. The result has been a greater number of applications, a higher proportion of successful applications, and potentially greater scope for a cluttered trade mark system.

In order to restore some balance to the trade mark applications process, the Commission recommends re-introducing ‘mandatory disclaimers’ — a tool that allows the trade mark registrar to omit elements of a mark from registration, especially for elements that many traders may have an interest in or need to use to brand their goods and services. Higher fees for applications in multiple or entire classes of goods or services would decrease the incentive for applicants to seek protection beyond what is necessary.

The law that governs parallel imports of trade marked goods would also benefit from reform. Parallel imports — the importation of legitimately trade marked goods produced in another country — can be blocked by owners or licensees of the mark in Australia. While the Trade Marks Act does contain provisions about when parallel imports may be allowed, recent legal cases have ‘muddied the waters’ to the point where firms are unsure if they are able to import marked goods legally or not. Amending the Act, to make clear that parallel imports are allowed, would resolve any confusion and benefit consumers.

6 Sui generis rights

A further category of protection is that of sui generis rights, which fill perceived gaps in established IP protection. In Australia, the IP embodied in plant varieties and circuit layouts are protected by sui generis rights.

Plant breeder’s rights

Plant breeder’s rights (PBR) provide rights holders with exclusive control over the sale and propagation of registered plant varieties — 25 years in the case of trees or vines, and 20 years for all other plants. PBR protection is less extensive than patent protection because of the breeder’s exception, which allows new plant varieties to be used immediately as inputs to further breeding programs. The breeder’s exception recognises the incremental and long-term nature of conventional plant breeding.

PBRs have helped transform agricultural plant breeding in Australia by introducing competition and price signals to a market that was previously characterised by a high degree of state provision. Growers now pay directly for access to new plant varieties, and their willingness to pay rewards successful breeders.

Notwithstanding the success of the regime in encouraging greater private sector activity, plant breeders and other stakeholders have expressed concern that the scope of protection provided by PBRs is being undermined by technological changes, which may have opened
the door to unauthorised copying. Amending the Act to close a loophole would avoid situations where breeders can copy and sell PBR-protected varieties, so long as they do not attempt to register the copied varieties with IP Australia. The use of a market-impact test to support existing tests of difference between plant varieties could further reduce the risk of fraudulent or copycat breeding, and ensure that initial and follow-on breeders share appropriately in the value each has contributed to a new plant variety.

Misrepresentation of varieties and/or refusal to pay royalties remains a concern. Improving compliance with royalty and licensing agreements is best achieved through closer cooperation and consultation, with industry groups best placed to lead these efforts. There is scope to make greater use of end-point-royalty systems, particularly in the horticulture and nursery sectors.

**Circuit layout rights — small circuits, big requirements**

Circuit layout rights (CLRs) protect the layout designs (three dimensional topography) of integrated circuits. The rights granted to circuit designers are narrow and rapid change in the industry has brought the need for CLRs into question. Most circuits are custom designed for specific purposes and not generally adaptable for other uses.

Australia’s adoption of CLRs is illustrative of the ‘protect first, assess later’ way IP rights have been expanded in the past. While the legislative protection for circuit layouts was premature, the removal of such rights needs to be carefully assessed. The Commission seeks further information on the implications of repealing the Circuit Layout Act.

**7 Looking at the bigger picture**

**The interaction between IP rights and competition policy**

Currently, holding an IP right does not offer protection from competition policy — Part IV of the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth) (CCA) applies generally to IP transactions. However, section 51(3) of the CCA provides a limited exception from most of the competition law prohibitions for licensing or assignment of IP.

The original rationale for section 51(3) is unclear. It was most likely intended to provide IP rights holders with greater certainty when engaging in licensing and assignment activity at a time when IP rights and competition policy were thought to be in fundamental conflict. This is no longer the prevailing view, and there is no logic to the continued disparate application of competition law.

Arguably, the nexus between IP arrangements and competition policy will take on greater importance as the level of licensing and cross licensing (especially in pharmaceutical and communication markets) increases. Rather than adopt a binary approach to retaining or
dispensing with the exemption a more nuanced approach — which gives the ACCC the power to address genuinely anticompetitive conduct while at the same time minimising uncertainty for rights holders and licensees where practices are socially valuable — would provide more meaningful benefits. This could be achieved by repealing section 51(3) and requiring the ACCC to issue guidance on the application of Part IV of the CCA to IP.

Achieving greater compliance through improved access

Many inquiry participants raised concerns about Australia’s IP enforcement arrangements. The time and cost of enforcing rights, issues relating to online copyright infringement, and access by SMEs were particular themes.

In contemplating reforms, it is important to remember that enforcement is not an end in itself. The level and scope of enforcement actions by the Australian Government, and any penalties for IP infringement, should be set in a way that enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall IP system and takes into account other approaches for improving compliance.

Is there a case for further action on online copyright infringement?

Both rights holders and consumer organisations raised concerns about online copyright infringement. Some see Australia’s efforts to curb unauthorised downloading as woefully inadequate, others consider existing steps as overreach. Arguments made in submissions reflect the polarised stance on this issue.

Empirical evidence on the effect such infringement has on rights holders is mixed. While some studies find a negative effect, others do not. Drawing a causal link between copyright infringement and economic impacts is not straightforward. While some infringement no doubt reduces the revenue rights holders can earn from selling their work, at least a proportion of infringement is unlikely to be displacing sales, with infringers consuming material only because it is free.

Consumer research consistently demonstrates a clear link between the incidence of online copyright infringement and the price and/or unavailability of copyright-protected content in Australia. However, information on copyright-protected works, their respective rights holders and options for consumers to access content are not collected, hindering both the development of new approaches to digital delivery and legitimate avenues for consumption.

Improvements in content availability and pricing are key to reducing infringement. Recent efforts to improve consumer licensing, such as the Copyright Hub being developed in the United Kingdom, are welcome developments. While many local rights holders and intermediaries are late coming to the digital era, they, not governments, continue to be responsible for driving the innovative solutions required.
Improving dispute resolution, including for SMEs

While Australia’s court-based dispute resolution appears to work well for disputes between large firms, inquiry participants noted the particular difficulties facing SMEs, especially the high costs and risks involved. Many argued the United Kingdom’s Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) was a good model for addressing such SME concerns.

The Commission has examined the case for establishing a specialised IP court in Australia, along the lines of the IPEC. The benefits of the IPEC derive largely from its ability to hear cases in a more streamlined manner than traditionally taken by courts; by having lower filing fees; and by limiting the amount of damages and costs that can be claimed and awarded between litigants. In the Commission’s view, potential exists to replicate many of the benefits of the IPEC approach within Australia’s existing court system.

The recent self-initiated reforms of the Federal Court will provide many of the benefits afforded by the IPEC model. A further option, on which the Commission is seeking feedback, is whether the Federal Circuit Court, which was established to be a lower cost court with less formal rules, could play a greater role in resolving lower value IP disputes. This might involve expanding the jurisdiction of the court to cover all IP matters, and better separating its jurisdiction from the Federal Court. This would ensure cases involving smaller claims would be heard in the Federal Circuit Court.

Such an approach mimics the way other civil cases are heard in the state court system, and could improve enforcement outcomes including for SMEs.

Improving IP governance and policy making

The three main public institutions in Australia’s IP system are the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, IP Australia and the Department of Communications and the Arts. IP Australia administers laws relating to patents, trade marks, designs, some geographical indications and plant breeder’s rights, and shares responsibility for policy development for these rights with the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science. The Department of Communications and the Arts has recently taken on responsibility for copyright policy advice, circuit layout rights and administering copyright law.

Good policy outcomes depend on more than just well-designed rules. Institutional and governance settings that support coherent policy development and decision making are of enduring importance. The reforms to competition policy in the 1990s, which saw Treasury take on the role as an overseeing agency and bring an economywide and global perspective, illustrate the importance of this observation.

Inquiry participants have raised several concerns about the current institutional arrangements, including:
- fragmented policy responsibilities and a lack of integrated policy advice
• potential conflicts between IP Australia’s dual roles of IP rights administrator and IP policy adviser
• the need for independent policy advice and improvements to the evidence base.

In order to promote a more coherent, economy wide perspective, there would be enduring value in specifying the overarching objectives of the IP system, to guide agencies and departments involved in IP policy development and administration. A common framework for formulating IP policy might also assist; the four principles employed by the Commission throughout this report — coupled with a robust evidence base — provide a ready starting point. A ‘policy champion’, with an integrated and economy wide focus, would also help achieve a much-needed balance of perspectives in IP policy. The Commission is seeking feedback on whether consolidating responsibility for IP policy in a single entity would help achieve this outcome and, if so, where policy responsibility might best reside.

A clearer delineation of responsibilities between policy development and administration would also be helpful. In making any separation clear, it is important to note that the division will not be absolute but a matter of degree. IP Australia (like other regulators and rights administrators) will always have technical and working expertise that is an integral input to policy development and design. The Commission is seeking feedback on where the dividing line between IP policy development and administration should be set and how to make the delineation more transparent.

Impartial and credible expert advice can be valuable in policy development where there is a need to draw on additional expertise and/or manage any real or perceived risk of undue influence on the policy development process. Some inquiry participants questioned whether there would be as much scope for independent input on IP policy following the recent abolition of the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property — an independent body that advised on IP matters and the strategic administration of IP Australia. While the Commission believes there is a good case for facilitating independent input on IP policy development, this need not come from a standing body. Selectively drawing upon broader panels of experts, on a tailored and as needed basis, achieves many of the benefits of a standing advisory body, while offering greater flexibility and timeliness, at a lower cost.

Improving processes for international agreements

The quality of the information and evidence base upon which policy makers rely, and the transparency of their policy formulation processes, are critical for good policy outcomes. Over the past two decades, across many areas of policy, there has been an improvement in public consultation processes.

Notwithstanding the fact that international treaties have a strong influence on Australia’s IP settings and are difficult to reverse, improvement in public consultation processes in this area have been more limited. Many inquiry participants, including CHOICE, continue to
express concerns about Australia’s approach to negotiating IP provisions in international agreements, and the absence of what they see as meaningful stakeholder consultation.

The Commission and others have previously made suggestions for improving treaty making processes, including through greater use of independent and public review processes and more effective consultation. The Commission considers that these suggested improvements are equally valid in respect of agreements relating to IP.

In addition to these general reforms, there are a number of specific reforms that would enable the Australian Government to take a more strategic approach to the negotiation of IP provisions in international agreements. These include undertaking more comprehensive consideration of domestic IP interests and developing model agreements covering IP. The Commission is seeking feedback on these and other measures adopted internationally to improve transparency and decision making around IP obligations.

**International cooperation**

Australia is party to a number of international agreements on IP, dating back to the 19th century. The intent of these agreements was to extend systems of protection internationally, and to make it easier to administer IP rights in different jurisdictions.

However, international agreements that commit Australia to specific terms and conditions relating to substantive aspects of our domestic IP arrangements — such as the duration of patent or copyright protection — have tended to work against Australia’s interests. Agreements embodying provisions on the scope and term of IP protection necessarily involve a ‘wrestle for rents’ — Australia should not capitulate too easily.

Further, in more recent times, there has been a tendency to favour bilateral and regional initiatives over multilateral ones, resulting in overlapping and complex rules. Multilateral approaches can avoid this outcome, while also helping to ensure that the system as a whole does not impose costs on many nations for the benefit of a few — making international policy settings truly international.

In general, Australia’s approach to cooperating with other countries on IP arrangements should aim to minimise the transactions costs associated with assigning, using and enforcing IP rights, without compromising the capacity to choose IP policy settings appropriate to Australia’s national interests. Such efforts will be most effective when pursued multilaterally rather than through bilateral arrangements. Supporting global cooperation among international patent offices through WIPO is a good example.
8 The community as a whole will be better off

The Commission’s draft recommendations have been made on the grounds that collectively they advance the balance of interests needed in Australia’s IP arrangements and thereby the wellbeing of the Australian community.

As with many other reforms, those who seek to gain from IP protections are concentrated and have actively sought to shape policy for their benefit, while those who stand to lose are dispersed and less aware of what is at stake, and so are less vocal and influential in policy debates.

The Commission’s recommendations have sought to redress this imbalance. Improving Australia’s IP arrangements will primarily benefit consumers by improving access to new and cheaper goods and services and reducing unintentional or accidental infringement. Downstream innovators, including innovative SMEs, will also benefit from lower costs and less uncertainty regarding potential infringement — encouraging greater follow-on innovation. Government and ultimately taxpayers will also benefit from a substantial reduction in health costs through the PBS.

The Commission has sought to minimise unnecessary costs on rights holders. That said, the Commission’s changes are intended to make those rights that are not delivering an overall benefit to the community more difficult to acquire in the future. These changes are designed to better target IP protection to instances where ‘free riding’ by users would undermine the economic incentive to create and disseminate inventions and works, and to limit strategic behaviour and gaming of the system. The Commission has made a number of suggestions for minimising any uncertainty associated with its proposed changes.
Draft recommendations, findings and information requests

Chapter 2: The analytical framework

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 2.1
In formulating intellectual property policy, the Australian Government should be informed by a robust evidence base and have regard to the principles of:

- **effectiveness**, which addresses the balance between providing protection to encourage additional innovation (which would not have otherwise occurred) and allowing ideas to be disseminated widely
- **efficiency**, which addresses the balance between returns to innovators and to the wider community
- **adaptability**, which addresses the balance between providing policy certainty and having a system that is agile in response to change
- **accountability**, which balances the cost of collecting and analysing policy–relevant information against the benefits of having transparent and evidence–based policy that considers community wellbeing.

Chapter 4: Copyright term and scope

DRAFT FINDING 4.1
Australia’s copyright system has expanded over time, often with no transparent, evidence-based policy analysis demonstrating the need for, or quantum of, new rights.

DRAFT FINDING 4.2
While hard to pinpoint an optimal copyright term, a more reasonable estimate would be closer to 15 to 25 years after creation; considerably less than 70 years after death.
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 4.1
The Australian Government should amend the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) so the current terms of copyright protection apply to unpublished works.

Chapter 5: Copyright accessibility: licensing and exceptions

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 5.1
The Australian Government should implement the recommendation made in the House of Representatives Committee report At What Cost? IT pricing and the Australia tax to amend the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to make clear that it is not an infringement for consumers to circumvent geoblocking technology.
The Australian Government should seek to avoid any international agreements that would prevent or ban consumers from circumventing geoblocking technology.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 5.2
The Australian Government should repeal parallel import restrictions for books in order for the reform to take effect no later than the end of 2017.
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 5.3

The Australian Government should amend the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (Copyright Act) to replace the current fair dealing exceptions with a broad exception for fair use.

The new exception should contain a clause outlining that the objective of the exception is to ensure Australia’s copyright system targets only those circumstances where infringement would undermine the ordinary exploitation of a work at the time of the infringement. The Copyright Act should also make clear that the exception does not preclude use of copyright material by third parties on behalf of users.

The exception should be open ended, and assessment of whether a use of copyright material is fair should be based on a list of factors, including:

- the effect of the use on the market for the copyright protected work at the time of the use
- the amount, substantiality or proportion of the work used, and the degree of transformation applied to the work
- the commercial availability of the work at the time of the infringement
- the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is commercial or private use.

The Copyright Act should also specify a non–exhaustive list of illustrative exceptions, drawing on those proposed by the Australian Law Reform Commission.

The accompanying Explanatory Memorandum should provide guidance on the application of the above factors.

Chapter 6: Patent system fundamentals

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 6.1

The Australian Government should amend ss. 7(2) and 7(3) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) such that an invention is taken to involve an inventive step if, having regard to the prior art base, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art.

The Australian Government should state the following in the associated Explanatory Memorandum:

- the intent of this change is to better target socially valuable inventions
- the test should be applied by asking whether a course of action required to arrive at the invention or solution to the problem would have been obvious for a person skilled in the art to try with a reasonable expectation of success.

The Australian Government should explore opportunities to further raise the overall threshold for inventive step in collaboration with other countries in international forums.
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 6.2

The Australian Government should incorporate an objects clause into the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth) (Patents Act). The objects clause should describe the purposes of the legislation as being to enhance the wellbeing of Australians by providing patent protection to socially valuable innovations that would not have otherwise occurred and by promoting the dissemination of technology. In doing so, the patent system should balance the interests of patent applicants and patent owners, the users of technology — including follow-on innovators and researchers — and Australian society as a whole.

The Australian Government should amend the Patents Act such that, when making a decision in relation to a patent application or an existing patent, the Commissioner of Patents and the Courts must have regard to the objects of the Patents Act.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 6.3

The Australian Government, with input from IP Australia, should explore the costs and benefits of using higher and more pronounced renewal fees later in the life of a standard patent, and making greater use of claim fees to limit the breadth of patent protection and to reduce strategic use of patents.

The Australian Government should seek international cooperation on making greater use of patent fees to help ensure that patent holders are not overcompensated and to limit the costs of patent protection on the community.

Chapter 7: Innovation patents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 7.1

The Australian Government should abolish the innovation patent system.

Chapter 8: Business methods and software patents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 8.1

The Australian Government should amend s. 18 of the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth) to explicitly *exclude* business methods and software from being patentable subject matter.
Chapter 9: Pharmaceutical patents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 9.1

The Australian Government should reform extensions of patent term for pharmaceuticals such that they are calculated based only on the time taken for regulatory approval by the Therapeutic Goods Administration over and above one year.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 9.2

Regardless of the method of calculating their duration (draft recommendation 9.1), extensions of term in Australia should only be granted through a tailored system which explicitly allows for manufacture for export in the extension period.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 9.3

There should be no extension of the period of data protection, including that applicable to biologics.

Further, in the context of international negotiations, the Australian Government should work with other nations towards a system of eventual publication of clinical trial data in exchange for statutory data protection.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 9.4

The Australian Government should introduce a transparent reporting and monitoring system to detect any pay-for-delay settlements between originator and generic pharmaceutical companies. This system should be administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.

The monitoring should operate for a period of five years. Following this period, the Australian Government should institute a review of the regulation of pay-for-delay agreements (and other potentially anticompetitive arrangements specific to the pharmaceutical sector).
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 9.5
The Australian Government should reform s. 76A of the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth) to improve data collection requirements. Thereafter, extensions of term should not be granted until data is received in a satisfactory form.

After five years of data has been collected, it should be used as part of a review to consider the ongoing costs and benefits of maintaining the extension of term system.

Chapter 10: Registered designs

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 10.1
Australia should not join the Hague Agreement until an evidence-based case is made, informed by a cost–benefit analysis.

DRAFT FINDING 10.1
Despite the deficiencies of the registered design system, Australia has committed internationally to protecting designs and there is no clear superior alternative.
Chapter 11: Trade marks and geographical indications

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 11.1

In order to improve the effectiveness of the trade mark system, the Australian Government should:

- restore the power for the trade mark registrar to apply mandatory disclaimers to trade mark applications, consistent with the recommendation of the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property in 2004
- repeal part 17 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (Trade Marks Act)
- amend s. 43 of the Trade Marks Act so that the presumption of registrability does not apply to the registration of marks that could be misleading or confusing
- amend the schedule of fees for trade mark registrations so that higher fees apply for marks that register in multiple classes and/or entire classes of goods and services.

IP Australia should:

- require the Trade Marks Office to return to its previous practice of routinely challenging trade mark applications that contain contemporary geographical references (under s. 43 of the Trade Marks Act). Challenges would not extend where endorsements require goods and services to be produced in the area nominated
- in conjunction with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, link the Australian Trade Mark On-line Search System database with the business registration portal, including to ensure a warning if a registration may infringe an existing trade mark, and to allow for searches of disclaimers and endorsements.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 11.2

The Australian Government should amend s. 123 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) to ensure that parallel imports of marked goods do not infringe an Australian registered trade mark provided that the marked good has been brought to market elsewhere by the owner of the mark or its licensee. Section 97A of the Trade Marks Act 2002 (New Zealand) could serve as a model clause in this regard.
Chapter 12: Plant Breeder’s Rights

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 12.1
The Australian Government should proceed without delay to implement the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 2010 recommendation to amend the Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994 (Cth) to enable essentially derived variety declarations to be made in respect of any variety.

Chapter 14: Competition policy

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 14.1
The Australian Government should repeal s. 51(3) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Competition and Consumer Act).

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission should issue guidance on the application of part IV of the Competition and Consumer Act to intellectual property.

Chapter 15: IP and public institutions

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 15.1
All Australian, and State and Territory Governments should implement an open access policy for publicly-funded research. The policy should provide free access through an open access repository for all publications funded by governments, directly or through university funding, within 12 months of publication. The policy should minimise exemptions.

The Australian Government should seek to establish the same policy for international agencies to which it is a contributory funder, but which still charge for their publications, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Chapter 16: Institutional and governance arrangements

DRAFT FINDING 16.1
Model agreements on intellectual property would have the benefit of being fully transparent to Australian industry and to the broader community, as well as to foreign governments, so that all stakeholders are aware of what Australia sees as the ideal outcomes from a treaty.

Chapter 17: International cooperation

DRAFT FINDING 17.1
Approaches to international cooperation and lowering transaction costs will be most effective when pursued multilaterally rather than through bilateral arrangements. Moreover, harmonisation of laws is not the sole, or necessarily desirable, form of cooperation. Other approaches to international intellectual property cooperation can achieve their goals at lower cost and with greater flexibility.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 17.1
Australia should revive its role in supporting opportunities to promote global cooperation on intellectual property policy among intellectual property offices through the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization to avoid duplication and reduce transaction costs.

Chapter 18: Compliance and enforcement

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 18.1
The Australian Government should expand the safe harbour scheme to cover the broader set of online service providers intended in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).

DRAFT FINDING 18.1
The evidence suggests timely and cost-effective access to copyright-protected works is the most efficient and effective way to reduce online copyright infringement.
Requests for further information

INFORMATION REQUEST 5.1

Other than for libraries and archives, to what extent are copyright licence conditions being used by rights holders to override the exceptions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)? To what extent (if any) are these conditions being enforced and what are the resulting effects on users?

Would amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to preserve exceptions for digital material have any unintended impacts?

INFORMATION REQUEST 5.2

Is the code of conduct for copyright collecting societies sufficient to ensure they operate transparently, efficiently and at best practice?

INFORMATION REQUEST 5.3

Will the Australian Government’s proposed reforms to simplify and streamline education statutory licences result in an efficient and effective scheme? Should similar reforms be made to the operation of the government statutory licence scheme?

INFORMATION REQUEST 6.1

The Commission is seeking further information from participants on the likely costs and benefits from reforming patent filing processes. Would there be any unintended consequences from requiring applicants to construct their claims in the two–part form that applies in Europe or articulating why their invention is non–obvious? Are there better approaches available?

INFORMATION REQUEST 6.2

The Commission is seeking information from participants on the costs and benefits of an exemption from infringement for experimental activities that use a patented invention. Are there any examples in Australia where the efforts of researchers have been hindered by the lack of such an exemption?
INFORMATION REQUEST 8.1
What approaches or tests could be used to differentiate between inventions where the contribution of embedded software is trivial and inventions where the contribution of embedded software is genuinely deserving of patent protection? Should such tests be implemented in law or patent examination practices?

INFORMATION REQUEST 9.1
How can transparency requirements for pay-for-delay settlements be implemented in a manner that retains effectiveness but minimises compliance cost?

- Should there be public reporting of aggregated data?
- How can the system adequately capture agreements that involve the transfer of non-monetary benefits such as licences or transfer of rights?

INFORMATION REQUEST 11.1
To what extent — in terms of incidence and costs — is trade marked metadata used in a way to confuse consumers? Is such a problem likely to get worse or better?

INFORMATION REQUEST 11.2
To what extent and in what form does consumer confusion arise from the provision of wine and spirit geographical indications?

Under what circumstances should wine and spirit geographical indications be amended or repealed? Who should make such decisions?

INFORMATION REQUEST 12.1
Would extending essentially derived variety coverage to all plants reduce the potential for patent ‘sniping’ of varieties protected by Plant Breeder’s Rights?

The Commission is also seeking feedback on the practicalities of developing and implementing a market–impact test to complement existing tests of essentially derived variety status.
INFORMATION REQUEST 13.1
What would be the implications of repealing the Circuit Layout Act 1989 (Cth)? Are there better ways to provide circuit layout rights?

INFORMATION REQUEST 14.1
Is there any evidence that grant-back obligations or economic hold-up are widespread problems in Australia? Is there a risk of these becoming problems in the future?

INFORMATION REQUEST 16.1
What institutional and governance settings would best ensure that IP policy benefits from a policy champion and is guided by an overarching policy objective and an economywide perspective?

Would vesting IP policy responsibility in a single department further these goals, and if so, which department would be best placed to balance the interests of rights holders and users, including follow-on innovators?

Are there any complementary or alternative measures that would help facilitate more integrated and evidence-based IP policy-making?

INFORMATION REQUEST 16.2
Is there merit in establishing a clearer separation between policy and administrative functions for intellectual property, and if so, where should the dividing line lie?

What mechanisms are available for transparently setting out the separation of IP policy and administration responsibilities?

INFORMATION REQUEST 16.3
What features should be included in a model agreement covering intellectual property if one were to be adopted?
INFORMATION REQUEST 17.1

How extensively have mechanisms such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty and patent prosecution highways been used to reduce the transaction costs of obtaining IP protection overseas? Have Australian businesses utilised opportunities for licensing through SourceIP? Are there other options that would facilitate and promote the licensing and transfer of intellectual property between Australia and other countries?

INFORMATION REQUEST 18.1

Would changes to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court improve access to dispute resolution by small– and medium–sized enterprises? Should additional rules be introduced, such as caps on the amount of costs claimable in a case? What is the upper limit on damages claims the court should hear?

Are there resourcing impediments to the proposed reforms to the Federal Circuit Court?

Can greater use be made of cost orders in the Federal Court, including for discovery, to reduce costs further? Should additional Federal Court rules be introduced, such as caps on the amount of costs claimable in a case?