Competition in the financial system

Speech

Peter Harris presented a speech to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) on 26 February 2018 in Melbourne.

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Banks and insurance companies have special status in any developed economy, and deservedly so.

In Australia today, our money is safely held, the costs of doing so are reasonably well managed, and technology to allow us access to our money is adapted and applied reasonably rapidly.

And banks and insurers do try to apply different technology strategies in particular to attract different classes of customer.

Collectively, they manage risks and facilitate transactions that – without the high level of confidence created by a network of dependable parties – none of us individually would be able to manage effectively… bitcoin notwithstanding.

So far, so good.

With this special status comes both strong support via regulation and an unwritten expectation of social responsibility.

And these involve in turn the formation of understandings and relationships and activities up to and including price-setting that are unique amongst private sector markets.

The Productivity Commission can be an unwelcome presence in unusual environments like these. There is a lot of money, pride and power tied up in finance. And a lot of system awareness for us to pick up in a short time.

Yet we believe there is value in the occasional analysis from the ground up, taking nothing for granted, as is our special skill. It is a practice not much seen today. We welcome the chance to undertake this task.

In our modern guise i.e. since 1998 the Productivity Commission has never been asked to look at the finance sector as a whole.

We have looked at aspects of it – superannuation, small business finance, bankruptcy and some taxation angles - in recent years. But until David Murray recommended in his Financial System Inquiry that we look at the sector’s overall competitiveness, the finance sector has not seen - nor I expect known - much of us.

Finance is not alone. The core policy aspects of health or education are equally important elements of industry structure in Australia, and they too have not seen much of us, although we have tried to offer some analysis in last year’s Shifting the Dial 5-yearly Report.

Together these three add up to more than 20% of the economy….and expanding, in government influence as well as private investment.

We received good assistance from the regulators in the course of this novel inquiry – APRA, the RBA and ASIC.

Our report does propose important but subtle changes to how they work with each other and with the industry.

This was not because we found them to be lacking in the crucial ingredients for good regulators: high levels of competence and a willingness to consider alternatives. Far from it.

But rather because the degree of competition in the finance sector’s principal consumer markets is substantially a factor created by regulation and regulators.

And consequent upon that is perhaps the most important underlying theme in the draft report: that without proactive regulator thinking on competition, we should not expect anything other than very occasional bouts of fierce competition in the principal banking and insurance markets.

Put another way, serious rivalry – particularly in price – will for long periods of time tend to be dormant.

In saying that, we are very conscious that it might suggest we have given up at the draft Report stage. So I feel obliged to say we have not. But if we are to be effective in better policy design, we first have to be realistic.

Reality appears to work roughly like this. Fierce competition brings with it the risk of instability. And instability is not acceptable over the medium term to the regulatory structure, acting in the interests of depositors (i.e. us) and the broader economy.

Thus regulators apply controls on the degree of competition faced by many market participants. And since the GFC, regulators’ ability to and willingness to intervene has risen, aided by international standards to which we in Australia as a capital importer necessarily need to broadly adhere.

What this means in sum is that regulators must be at the heart of our Report.

And our recommendations affecting them are both powerful and yet focused on intangibles: not on rank failures, but rather the nuances and subtleties in regulatory arrangements and their impact on consumers.

I will talk about a few of these today.

While regulators were helpful, it was inevitable that, having been subject to so many inquiries in recent times, parts of the industry more broadly reacted with weary resignation to yet another one – ours.

Plus knowing that data is potent in the hands of quality analysts, we understood too the deep reluctance we encountered occasionally to the sharing of data. Disappointing as it nevertheless was.

And finally, in a sector where concepts like confidence are crucial, we recognise that it can be problematic for others to explain to our analytical satisfaction how intentions were translated into actions. We believe we have given this art rather than science due weight, when drawing conclusions.

But we did not back off, for all that.

We are asked by our Terms of Reference and the legislative statute that guides us to make judgments in areas where, in this case, competition appears to be lacking and where responses would be both cost effective and necessary.

So in a draft Report, we take a deep breath; we note the limitations of the evidence; we risk the criticism that at times must follow; but we nevertheless persist and use the draft to provoke debate.

We do it in order to encourage that debate of ideas. We hope to see more light emerge from such debates as we move into the public hearing phase, this week.

I mentioned a moment ago the potency of access to data.

When the topic is competition, being able to demonstrate whether or not parties hold market power, and if so the purposes for which they are using it, is a data-driven exercise if done properly.

We think we have demonstrated that there has been an exercise of market power in key product lines - deposits and home loans for example. The larger elements of the banking industry have shown an ability to maintain comfortable margins despite the shock of the GFC, followed by an era of unpredictably rapid falls in official rates; and yet to also keep market shares relatively stable. This is documented in the report.

I don’t think I am being unfair when I say the default position amongst data holders in this industry is set against transparency.

But we were genuinely surprised to find that they either do not hold data at all on some important aspects of decision-making, or for another reason could not supply them.

For example, the cost of mortgage brokers is quite high, $2300 for the average loan of $369,000, plus a trailing commission (more on that later) of $665. Other analysts have suggested higher numbers than these in high-priced locations but we will stick with national averages.

More than $2.4 billion is now paid annually for these services.

Some in the broking industry want to know why there is suddenly attention being paid to commissions. The sum I just cited, as a large apparent addition to industry costs since the mid 90s, by itself suggests a public analysis of why it is so large might be in order.

Wealth advisers, much derided though they are, seem to handle investments of the same order for much lower costs.

Moreover, the sum becomes problematic when it is also suggested that customers aren’t burdened by this as they don’t pay these costs. Which is a comment surely made for twitter - since anyone with a slight amount of commonsense knows that somewhere in any product purchase it is only a customer or a shareholder who could be paying this charge, unless offsetting costs have been stripped out.

Shareholders returns are pretty constant, so we would have liked to unpack that cost question a little, to see if the price was supported by cost savings.

With the data provided by banks, this proved to be near impossible. For smaller banks, we were able to develop some estimates of the branch costs they would potentially face, without broker assistance. But we received insufficient information from most (not all) banks, and so could not create a clear picture.

Thus we can’t say whether there has been a net improvement in efficiency, even as a large sum in commissions has been added to industry costs.

We have also shown in the report that brokers do produce slightly better rates for their clients than going in to the bank branch. But that benefit for consumers has been declining since the GFC. It would have been valuable to put the cost:benefit side by side.

Making the presumption – accurately, as it turns out – that we would find strong indications of the exercise of market power, some commentators had hinted in advance of the report that we might have major structural solutions to propose, like forcing break-ups of vertically integrated operations.

Our assessment is that the case for this, on the information we have to date, is not sustainable - for two reasons, primarily:

First, there are efficiencies to be found with vertical integration and they are observable.

Second, the solution needs to fit the problem. The problems that have been observable with integration are ones of real or claimed bad behaviour. It is also evident that there are poor performance incentives.

When direct solutions to this are available - and they are, we recommend some - forced divestment should be a last resort, rather than a first one.

Of course, if the necessary solutions prove commercially unpalatable, institutions themselves may then choose to divest.

Grouped under the usual ways of improving competition, in the draft Report you can see recommendations for:

  • better information to consumers
  • better transparency on the part of regulators and governments
  • removal of conflicts of interest; and
  • lower barriers to entry for both suppliers of product (e.g. new banks) and suppliers of services (e.g. wealth advisers might compete with mortgage brokers)
  • an access regime for a key piece of national infrastructure

It’s also strongly oriented towards taking advantage of better data in a digital world, as you would expect of the PC after our Data Availability and Use report last year.

Perhaps the most important data-based improvement lies with the proposed publication by ASIC of actual home loan rates recently negotiated, in as close to real time as possible.

Until recently, it would have been radical to suggest that banks could and should publish their actual median home loan rates in near to real time, across classes of customer and location. But today, it is not.

On its face, in fact, it is pretty absurd that customers still have to guess at what is a competitive rate for their new home loan might be before they commence negotiations. And try as we might, we could find no sound reason why this was so.

In no other industry is the price of a major purchase so apparently shrouded in smoke and shadow, featuring concepts like the standard variable rate, or the comparison rate.

Perhaps these notional benchmarks were once well-intentioned substitutes for reality, when comprehensive information was not gathered and could not be published quickly.

But not today.

The sector has the ability to keep the market fully informed of price differences when they emerge, even if they are only the product of weak competition. Today, we have digital data. It’s cheap, it’s already assembled inside each financial institution and it’s not radical any more to think that such prices can be published to add to consumers’ knowledge.

In a highly competitive market, some institution would probably seize the initiative and launch this themselves, for the positive brand recognition value alone.

Because of the opaque nature of pricing, many consumers feel the need for brokers.

The typical home loan is:

  • a major commitment
  • requires a sound ability to judge risk
  • has a price that you do not know until you have spent serious time on the transaction
  • may involve the obligatory purchase of other services (Lenders Mortgage Insurance, for example)
  • is a means to another purchase, rather than an end in itself.

This is very complicated. And mortgage brokers and mortgage securitisation were certainly a godsend for a period from the mid 1990s.

They broke down both knowledge and capability barriers: knowledge of the system and where the opportunities lay; and capability to negotiate a deal.

No wonder they thrived and consumers benefited. Prices fell and service quality rose. This was the last time we had fierce competition in the largest loan markets.

But since late last decade, this revolution has been slowly but surely absorbed into the establishment. About 70% of the broker channel is now bank-owned or controlled.

We are not arguing that the better use of real time actual price data would so simplify things for consumers as to make brokers redundant. There are many other aspects to a loan, beyond price, that still may intimidate a first-time home owner. But it would certainly offer a choice for them as inexperienced consumers.

And competitive markets thrive on choice.

There is also a benefit in publication of actual prices for existing mortgagees. This might help them to recognise when loyalty isn’t being rewarded, and seek a better deal.

Genuine price data will also complement the duty of care we propose, to ensure a bank-owned broker acts in the customer’s best interest.

As I noted a moment ago, on our estimates banks’ broking aggregators have about 70% of the home loan broking business.

We noted in the draft Report that at the time banks decided to move in to buy up brokerages – a legitimate commercial decision, we do not find a case on competition grounds to oppose integration, nor to this point has the ACCC - they might have made a conscious decision to address what seem obvious conflicts of interest.

For example, a consumer expects the broker will negotiate for him or her, and not favour the bank. Ownership surely complicates this.

Experience with similar conflicts of interest in wealth management and the disastrous effect they had on some aspects of banks’ public standing might have further encouraged such thoughts.

But that did not happen.

Brokerages’ Approved Product Lists may thus give the illusion of choice, with an array of branded products sourced from a single lender, or white-labelled to tie customer loyalty to that brokerage.

And not all brokers at a particular brokerage need even be accredited to offer all the products that the brokerage advertises. It’s an extreme scenario, perhaps, but your broker may only be accredited to advise on house products, despite what is on the glossy paper.

Consequent or not, in-house products appear to dominate disproportionately the outcomes for borrowers who use bank-owned aggregators. In 2015, the Commonwealth Bank had 21% overall market share in the broker channel but a 37% market share via its aggregator Aussie Home Loans.

Beyond the incentives that are influenced by ownership are the incentives faced by an individual broker.

Despite some recently announced industry changes to parts of the commission payment structure, commission earned by brokers remains far from aligned with the interests of the customer.

Trailing commissions are an example of that. These are only paid while a customer remains with a loan. They are worth $1bn pa. There is nothing immaterial about them.

The industry itself has said that trailing commissions are designed to reduce churn and manage customers on behalf of banks.

Despite the hint to the contrary, we do actually understand quite well why it might be in a bank’s interest and a broker’s interest to jointly limit churn.

But not the customer’s interest – who (the data is surprisingly unavailable, as noted earlier) is most probably paying for the service.

Given the unhappy experience with misaligned incentives in wealth management, being able to substantiate the assurance that a broker is acting in the customer’s best interest would seem to be pretty desirable today.

As the Productivity Commission, we would prefer that, rather than regulation, the banks imposed this duty on their brokers, perhaps via contract; and promoted it, to the benefit of their reputations.

But we have no power to recommend what banks do for themselves, so we have instead a draft Report that proposes regulation.

For independent brokers, the case is a little more nuanced:

  • first, the data does suggest that brokers as a group are still achieving slightly better (but less so in recent years) results for customers than simply going in to the branch
  • second, the wealth advisory industry since the FoFA reforms has experienced increasing market concentration, and we would not want to add to market concentration for this service until we can determine better whether there is cause and effect.

Thus the draft report limits the call to regulate to bank-owned brokers.

But we are also considering applying additional competition across all brokers, as another possible way of reducing cost to consumers, by allowing licensed financial service providers such as financial planners to offer home loans as a product.

There appears to be no sound reason why qualified advisers are presently not allowed to deal in this product, but they are not.

We are seeking further input on this, before finalising a view.

We also found some possibly good news for small and medium enterprises and the banks that tend to lend to them.

Australia has been quite conservative in its application of risk weightings to small business lending, with a strong leaning towards a home mortgage as the preferred security basis for a bank loan.

Other countries have, without threatening their system stability, taken up Basel standards that diversify SME risk weightings, lowering them in some cases. We have recommended APRA take account of this.

What this means is that banks may require in future less capital to hold against small business loans that are not secured by a house mortgage; and could expand their appetite for such loans, within their current capital allocation.

We believe APRA now has this under active consideration. Our final report will provide an update on the Recommendation.

We also have proposed reforms to payments systems where current practice may prevent consumers and merchants from taking the lowest cost option for making in-store payments.

Small businesses are least able to manage this conflict and the changes proposed could reduce cost and inconvenience for them.

Moving from the important and worthy to the controversial, the Finding we made on the 4 Pillars policy made quite a few headlines.

We called it redundant policy. What that means is that if it ever once had a role in sustaining competition, that day is long past. Thus it is redundant.

While some have gone so far as to suggest the radicals in the PC have lost their minds and put competition under threat, let me show you what the Wallis Inquiry in 1997 actually said, and judge for yourself how radical we are, twenty years later:

Competition concerns appear to have been the original justification for the ‘six pillars’ policy. However, as this Report demonstrates, the financial system is dynamic and the pace of change is likely to accelerate, not slow down. Thus, any static policy may become outdated.

Also, as discussed above, the Inquiry has taken the view that the financial system should be subject to the same set of competition rules as the rest of the economy – namely, those contained in the Trade Practices Act and administered by the ACCC – and that no other competition regimes should be applied to the sector.

It follows that on competition grounds the Inquiry does not support continuation of the ‘six pillars’ policy, or a modified version of it.

This position should not be interpreted as representing a view on the desirability or otherwise of mergers among any of the ‘pillars’. Rather, the position simply states that the ACCC should assess the competition implications of any such proposal. It should do this in accordance with the merits of the proposal at the time it is made.

‘Redundant’ is a state of relevance, or lack thereof. It really doesn’t matter which politician swears that he will preserve this policy, it is and will for competition purposes be redundant regardless of such pledges.

Thus our point is not that removal of the 4 Pillars policy would encourage competition. Like Wallis, we would not argue that three or two is better than four (or six, covering insurers too, as it was back in the 1990 decision that gave birth to this tenet of policy faith).

The problem with such policies is the comfort that they induce. In this case, the false hope that banks must be competing because we have and will always have at least 4 of them.

We know policymakers aren’t fooled by this (and neither are banks). So what’s the harm in keeping it?

In a broader national welfare and efficiency analysis, which the PC’s legislation invites us to consider whenever we receive a Terms of Reference, it is probably shareholders who have most reason to complain.

By the by, that’s just about all of us via our superannuation funds.

The 4 Pillars policy removes an important market discipline from these four major businesses, should management make serious errors of judgment.

As David Murray has lately observed, even if the 4 Pillars policy was put through the shredder, there are still direct legislative powers that limit ownership in any licenced deposit-taking business.

We recognised this. We even have a Recommendation on it.

But in our analysis, far from being a reason to keep the 4 Pillars, lifting the allowable level of ownership in any bank – not just new banks – might introduce some market discipline on misadventures in say US home lenders or UK banks or foreign exchange markets …over the past decade or two, there have been a few of them.

As I said earlier, it’s an issue really for shareholders, thus in this competition analysis we stop there, and leave it to them.

Lest we forget it, the ACCC will always have a say in any attempt at change of ownership that prospectively substantially reduces competition.

Thus from a competition perspective, we are inclined to consign the 4 Pillars policy to the shredder.

The other controversial proposal we made was in regard to the exercise of macro prudential intervention.

Just to repeat, we were asked to undertake an analysis of competition and influences on it. Not a review of prudential success. Having both is desirable, and we can.

Macro prudential intervention – directions to banks from the regulator, APRA, that is charged with maintaining overall system stability - is pretty novel stuff, here and around the world.

Novelty has been most evident since the GFC, but in fact the prudential regulator will still have an effect on competition in a future time when shifts in the official cash rate are again common. So the impact of such interventions was clearly within scope for us.

Broadly stated, risk is what will motivate APRA to intervene. Such was the case in 2014 and again in 2017.

And yet risk-taking is at the heart of competition. And, dare I say it, innovation. And thus to productivity.

Our focus is on the quality and availability of the pre-implementation analysis of the potential damage to competition. We do not propose that APRA would be fettered in subsequently doing whatever it chooses. We have confidence in its ability to consider the matters raised by any improved analysis.

And again we are not being terribly radical. Strengthening the consideration of competition beyond the present general legislative guidance to ‘have regard to’ effects on competition has relatively recently been the subject of alteration to the remit of the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority. The UK acknowledged, in doing so, the need for more proactive approach to competition. A subtle change, such as we too propose; but a powerful one, for all that.

The lack of publicly available pre-implementation competition analysis and the way the banks subsequently responded to these interventions is outlined in our draft Report. In 2017, there were price rises in some market segments including pre-existing loans, along with sought-after reductions in the future rate of flow of funds to that sector. In the language of the sector, the back-book was re-priced.

Those price rises - as these were investor loans - will be deductible in part and so a cost to taxpayers.

I’m sure someone will want to re-cut our estimate of that cost, up to $500m. Despite that, the point will almost certainly remain undiminished: there was a public cost as well as a private cost to borrowers, and these should both be accounted for in any analysis of the competition effects before the action is taken.

And this is only one aspect of a preferable competition analysis.

Fortunately, and quite desirably, we believe we do not need to change APRA’s legislative remit as the UK did in order to consider the impact on competition as it designs its intervention. What we propose is adding independence of the source of advice to it, while not altering the decision-maker. This is a subtlety that may have been missed by some commentators.

Our proposal is that, in the most important forum dealing with these matters – the Council of Financial Regulators - the competition champion is not a decision-maker. Rather it is a source of advice designated by the Treasurer, to be satisfied that competition is being considered in-depth.

And we propose to add the publication of Minutes from the discussion at the Council as the intervention takes effect, to enable greater clarity about both the target and the chosen means for the intervention.

This too would seem to be a desirable outcome for both competition and stability, and may assist in reinforcing the objective.

One last thing on macro prudential intervention, before I leave the topic.

One or two people we have encountered since the draft Report was published have asked how the intervention affects competition. The thought is that there may be a theoretical case for transparency and for considering the cost to taxpayers, but is this really about competition?

For us, the connection to competition seemed self-evident but we may need to expand upon it in the final report. For now, let me say there appear to be two aspects to this:

  • first, the intervention enabled notional competitors to act in concert, and provided them with a high level of awareness of others’ inability to compete, which is a direct reduction in competition
  • it appears that we may be training an industry to find profit in a regulator’s intervention where banks’ costs have not risen ie quite a different circumstance to when the cash rate rises
  • second, we may be in danger of operating a one-way ratchet on prices
  • to the extent that regulated businesses lift prices to achieve macro prudential outcomes, there appears to be nothing in the regulators’ tool box to see such premiums fall when the risk-taking passes
  • in a strongly competitive market, we could comfort ourselves that premiums will be competed away over time. In Australia, the market power held by the big regulated parties does not indicate that this is likely.

As I said at the outset, we welcome this chance to examine the competitiveness of the finance sector, it is a rare chance to scrutinise policy in a major part of the economy whose services we all depend upon.

We think the draft Report offers good opportunity for further debate about matters that rarely make it into public policy forums.

To that end, we are seeking submissions by 20 March.

Today’s comments are designed to encourage that participation.

Opening statement

Deputy Chair Alex Robson delivered an opening statement to the House of Representatives economics committee inquiry into promoting economic dynamism, competition and business formation.

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Thank you for the invitation to appear again before this Committee, and for the opportunity to make an opening statement.

When we last appeared before this Committee, our Advancing Prosperity 1 report had not yet been publicly released, so today I will spend a bit of time discussing that. I will also discuss some recent productivity trends, the relationship between productivity and real wages, and some trends in indicators of market dynamism as set out in our submission. I will conclude by touching upon the topic of competitive neutrality.

My main messages today are as follows:

  • Australia’s productivity performance has been anaemic for quite some time.
  • Productivity growth is a key driver of real wages growth.
  • Competition and business dynamism are, in turn, important drivers of productivity growth.
  • Several aggregate indicators suggest that competition and dynamism in Australia may be declining.
  • However, these aggregate indicators should be interpreted with care, particularly when it comes to the menu of policies that might address those trends, and the tradeoffs that might be involved.
  • There is no single policy silver bullet in relation to competition, dynamism and productivity.
  • A comprehensive microeconomic reform agenda – of the kind outlined in our recent Advancing Prosperity report – is needed.
  • Finally, we consider there is scope to improve Australia’s Competitive Neutrality policy and make it fit for purpose for the years and decades ahead.

In March this year we released our 5-year productivity report, Advancing Prosperity. The report emphasised the fact that over the decade to 2020, Australia’s productivity growth averaged just 1.1% per year – the slowest growth rate in 60 years.

Since that report was released, there have been several disappointing data releases on productivity. The recent data underscores our earlier key messages.

For example, the most recent National Accounts data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics shows that over the year to June, Australia’s level of productivity went backwards, declining by 3.6%. 2 That data also shows that productivity has declined in four of the last five quarters. As a result, GDP per hour worked is now at its lowest level since March 2016.

The outgoing Governor of the RBA recently warned that Australia’s living standards could stagnate in the face of our weak productivity performance. 3 Another view is that on current data trends, we would be lucky to achieve stagnation – it could turn out be another optimistic, “glass half full” prediction from the former Governor.

My own view is that Australia’s productivity challenge is urgent – but it did not happen overnight. It has been an urgent problem for many years. We can and must do better, but there is a way forward.

Productivity and real wages

Why does it matter? Productivity is about working smarter – not harder or longer. The recent data underscores this.

If the level of productivity is falling – as it has been over the past year – this means that on average, Australians had to work more hours just to produce and buy the same volume of goods and services.

In other words, over the past year, Australians on average have been working harder and longer – in effect, running to stand still. Real wages have also been going backwards, and this is no coincidence. Indeed, one of the very first findings in Advancing Prosperity is that in Australia, almost all sustained increases in real wages are underpinned by improvements in labour productivity growth.

Productivity Commission research released today 4 confirms this. This research examines so-called ‘wage decoupling’ – defined as average annual labour productivity growth minus average annual producer wage growth. We find that since 1995, only two sectors have exhibited strong wage decoupling: mining (4.9 percentage points) and agriculture (3.4 percentage points).

These two commodity-exporting – and highly productive – sectors account for just 4% of total employment, but around 18% of total value added. They therefore have a disproportionate impact on economy‑wide estimates of wage decoupling.

If we strip them out and examine the rest of the economy, average decoupling since 1995 has been just 0.1 percentage points. And in more than half of the sectors outside of mining and agriculture, decoupling was zero or negative.

In other words, since 1995 the wages of over 95% of Australia’s working population have risen very closely in line with productivity. And the average income gain from a productivity lift is more than eight times the potential gain from eliminating the limited decoupling across most of the economy. So productivity growth remains the main policy game.

Indicators of market dynamism

Given this, what should we do about our weak productivity performance? This committee is rightly focused on competition and market dynamism. 5

In a market-based economy like Australia, it is reasonable to expect that there would be a close link between competition, dynamism and productivity.

Business decisions are driven by the pursuit of profit and the avoidance of losses. Market prices guide those decisions, and are “a signal wrapped up in an incentive”, providing information to businesses about hiring decisions, where it invest, what to produce, how much to produce, when to sell it, where to sell, and to whom.

Well-functioning markets and healthy competition between businesses lead to lower prices, higher quality goods and services, greater consumer choice, and ultimately higher living standards.

However, if competitive forces are dulled or distorted, this can lead to incorrect price signals being provided, and poor outcomes for consumers and workers.

Australia’s economy and our markets are changing. Markets for services – which tend to be relatively labour intensive – now dominate, with 80% of activity and 90% of employment now in services. And many services are delivered without benefit of either the signal or incentives of markets. In many instances, labour is the service – think of health, aged care and disability care.

I will return to these points a bit later.

Our submission to this inquiry 6 focusses on a range of data which are proxies for market dynamism: firm entry and exit, concentration, price-markups, labour market mobility and investment.

Let me highlight some the key points of our submission in relation to these proxies.

  • While aggregate firm entry and exit rates can be an indicator of ‘creative destruction’ in the economy, they are not necessarily suggestive of broader underlying trends regarding dynamism.
  • Measures of market concentration – such as the four firm concentration (CR4) index or the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) – should be interpreted with a great deal of care, particularly at the aggregate level.
    • Indeed, the proposition that market concentration by itself must be negatively associated with productivity growth and economic well-being has been questioned by economists for at least 50 years. 7 As a matter of economic theory, it is straightforward to derive examples where a higher HHI (an indicator of greater market concentration) is associated with higher – rather than lower – overall economic wellbeing. 8 And in practice, as our submission discusses, the link between concentration and wellbeing greatly depends on the economic context.
    • In any case, at the industry level, our analysis of concentration dynamics shows that most Australian industries are not concentrated, and very few of became concentrated from 2006 to 2021. Moreover, the distribution of concentration measures across industries was relatively stable between 2006 and 2021.
  • Thus, the claim that the Australian economy is as a whole becoming more concentrated does not seem to hold up. Most Australian industries are not highly concentrated, and this has not changed much.
  • Related to this, firm mark ups – the gap between price and marginal cost – are often pointed to as indicators of market power and weak dynamism. There is some evidence that markups have been increasing in Australia.
    • However, this evidence is plagued by measurement issues. And, from a policy perspective, interpreting aggregate evidence on markups is not straightforward.
    • For example, if costs and prices are falling together (so that consumers are better off) but prices fall at a slower rate (so that markups rise), what is the appropriate policy response?
    • Or, to take another example, in the presence of large fixed costs (due, for example, to high up front capital costs), a gap between price and marginal cost may be required simply for a business to break even. In the presence of high fixed costs, higher markups could, in principle, even be associated with lower profits.
  • Some have gone further and claimed that “greedflation” abounds at the aggregate level in Australia, with firms across the economy using the recent increase in inflation to ‘unfairly’ mark-up prices over costs and increase profits.
    • The Commission does not agree with this claim. As our submission notes, overall, aggregate evidence does not suggest that high price margins associated with exploitation of market power have played a significant role in accentuating the higher input costs and supply constraints that precipitated the current inflationary episode.
  • Indeed, some may counter that the greedflation thesis seems to have been quickly overtaken by the facts.
    • Australia’s annual inflation rate appears to have peaked at 7.8% and has now declined to 6%. 9
    • Company profits declined by 13.1% in the June 2023 quarter, and fell by 11.8% over the year to June. 10
    • Some might ask: if there is greedflation, why were firms apparently greedy up until recently, but have now suddenly stopped being greedy?
  • As discussed at our appearance before this committee earlier in the year, an inflationary environment should not give businesses new opportunities for sustained exploitation of market power – if they possess this power, they will exploit it at any time.
    • And, consistent with our work on wage decoupling, our submission to this inquiry notes that stripping mining out of the corporate profits data indicates that profits have been stable as a share of total factor income. In fact, overall profits as a share of factor income declined to 30.2% in the June 2023 quarter, the lowest level since December 2021

To conclude on indicators of dynamism: while there are some indications that dynamism may be declining in Australia, it is difficult to draw specific policy implications from the data.

Advancing prosperity

However, the answer is not to sit back and declare that it is all too hard. On the contrary, there are several policy measures that the Commission believes would stack the odds in favour of greater competition and dynamism in Australia, and which would give us the best chance of meeting and overcoming our productivity challenge.

Some commentators have said that we should focus on a narrow set of policies – climate, technology and supply chains. These are obviously important, but we think the reform agenda is much broader.

In any case, it may come as a surprise to these commentators that the Commission and its predecessors have been thought-leaders in climate policy for more than three decades, with our first publication on the costs and benefits of emissions reductions appearing in 1991. 11

For all the talk about supply chains, as far as I am aware, our 2021 report on Vulnerable Supply Chains 12 remains the only rigorous, evidence-based analysis of that issue in Australia.

And of course, our annual Trade and Assistance Review 13 – now in its 49th year – provides up-to-date and cutting edge analysis of industry assistance and trade policy developments.

Advancing Prosperity sets out 71 policy recommendations across 29 reform directives. Our policy recommendations fall into five general areas:

  1. Building an adaptable workforce to supply the skilled workers for Australia’s future economy.
  2. Harnessing data, digital technology and diffusion to capture the dividend of new ideas.
  3. Creating a more dynamic economy through fostering competition, efficiency and contestability in markets.
  4. Lifting productivity in the non-market sector to deliver high quality services at the lowest cost.
  5. Securing net-zero at least cost to limit the productivity impact caused by climate change.

Our report also sets out a detailed prioritisation framework and implementation roadmap for meeting and overcoming our productivity predicament.

Many of recommendations are directly or indirectly related to competition and market dynamism, particularly given the changing structure of Australia’s economy towards services. For example in a service-based economy, fit for purpose labour market regulation is key, particularly in relation to the gig economy, which can be an important source of market entry, innovation and dynamism.

For the most part, real wages and productivity move together. Finding productivity improvements leads to increases in real wages. So labour market settings need to facilitate and indeed maximise cooperation between parties and encourage innovation, reward aspiration and effort, and preserve fairness.

Shoehorning platform work into other employment categories would put at risk its productivity impacts and its benefits for gig workers. But gig workers have genuine concerns that need to be taken very seriously. Improved safety protection and access to dispute resolution are warranted.

Our migration policy settings should be viewed through a productivity lens and focus on the composition of the intake at least as much as the aggregate quantum. In this regard, we think there is great merit in moving towards a system that places a greater emphasis on employer nomination, and less of a reliance on skill lists.

Reforms to occupational licensing arrangements would also assist with the better allocation and matching of scarce labour resources across the economy.

On digital infrastructure, we think there needs to be better regional internet connectivity, as well as policies in place to ensure that there is more transparency around digital infrastructure funding decisions and evaluation of previous investments.

And the market for internet connectivity may now be sufficiently developed to allow for a more competitive method of allocating funds.

Openness to trade, investment and international migration are key drivers of market dynamism and prosperity more generally. We recommend getting rid of our remaining tariffs, and progressively removing Australia’s anti-dumping and countervailing measures, and subjecting any new measures to an economywide cost benefit test.

We should increasingly accept product standards adopted in other leading economies as ‘deemed to comply’ with Australian standards. And we could bring application fees for proposed FDI into agricultural land assets closer into line with other forms of investment.

On taxation, we recommend a suite of reforms. In addition to abolishing Australia’s remaining tariffs, we also recommend abolishing stamp duty on insurance premiums, moving towards a more system of efficient road user pricing, and moving away from taxes that discourage encourage efficient asset transfers and capital allocation, such as stamp duty on property transactions.

Related to this, our systems of business and industrial planning and zoning could be improved, with an eye towards encouraging greater geographic competition between businesses. And there is scope for state and territory governments to improve public transport pricing arrangements.

Finally, on merger policy: we conclude that overall, there does not appear to be a strong case for the implementation of a new formal authorisation regime, of the kind proposed by the former chair of the ACCC. Instead, we think there may be more value in the ACCC further considering its internal merger review processes; and for government to consider how best to avoid perverse incentives across merger clearance procedures.

Competitive Neutrality Policy

To conclude, I would like to mention one aspect of the Commission’s responsibilities that we believe warrants a close look, and which could benefit from reform: the area of Competitive Neutrality.

It has been 30 years since the Hilmer Report on National Competition Policy – which was introduced by Prime Minister Keating as an “important contribution towards furthering competition policy in Australia”. 14

A key part of the Hilmer report dealt with the principle of competitive neutrality – the proposition that state-owned enterprises and private businesses should compete on a level playing field. Competitive neutrality (CN) policy is also concerned with government businesses that may compete with each other.

It has long been recognised that favourable conditions for government enterprises in relation to their private sector counterparts can distort all kinds of economic decisions – particularly around innovation, investment and hiring, ultimately leading to suboptimal outcomes for consumers and workers.

Those artificial cost advantages can also lead to resources (capital and labour) flowing to government businesses simply because of their government ownership rather than them being the most efficient (productive) users of resources. Where these resource allocation distortions occur, the nation’s productivity suffers.

The principle of competitive neutrality is likely to become increasingly important, particularly given the growth of the non-market sector (for example, in the care economy) and the re-entry of governments into some of the economy’s “commanding heights”, such as energy and telecommunications.

The Government's approach to operationalising CN principles is set out in the 1996 Competitive Neutrality Policy Statement 15 and the Competitive Neutrality Guidelines for Managers. 16 Unfortunately, Australian Government businesses sometimes fail to comply with these obligations and guidelines.

An integral part of competitive neutrality policy and its implementation is a competitive neutrality complaints handling mechanism, which is intended to bring some discipline to the implementation of competitive neutrality and provide ongoing accountability.

The Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office – the AGCNCO, a separate unit within the Commission – is that mechanism. It deals with any complaints and provides independent advice to Government following its investigations.

Any individual, organisation or government body with an interest in the application of competitive neutrality may lodge a complaint. While governments are not obliged to accept the AGCNCO’s advice, we think there needs to be a strong cop on the beat in relation to competitive neutrality.

However, although our competitive neutrality policy has served Australia well over the last three decades, it is deficient in several areas. To name just a few:

  1. Australia’s competitive neutrality policy lacks a credible enforcement regime.
  2. There is a lack of guidance on what a public interest test should embody and what it should look like.
  3. There are poor processes to ensure compliance with the policy by start-up government businesses.
  4. There is little guidance or principles on what constitutes ‘government’ in significant government business activities.
  5. There is little guidance on what policy or complaints process should apply for business activities with multiple government owners.
  6. There is no mention of the full range of possible material competitive advantages (other than those relating to tax, debt and regulatory neutrality and earning a commercial rate of return), and poor guidance on methodologies for estimating the value of some advantages.
  7. There is an absence of guidance on whether any identified cost advantages should be addressed by the imposition of a CN adjustment payment, or by directly addressing the source of the advantage.
  8. There is a need to reformulate the commerciality test in CN policy.

Australia recently signed up to the OECD’s Recommendation on Competitive Neutrality. 17 In light of this renewed commitment, and given this Committee’s – and the Government’s – focus on competition and dynamism, it may be an appropriate time to look more closely Australia’s competitive neutrality regime, with an eye to reform.

In this respect we support the earlier findings of the Competition Policy Review 18 (the Harper report), which recommended all Australian governments should review their competitive neutrality policies and complaint handling mechanisms to ensure they remain fit for purpose in the 21st century.

The Government’s recently announced two-year Competition Policy Review may provide a further opportunity to examine competitive neutrality policy.

References

Commonwealth of Australia (2015) Competition Policy Review, Final Report, March.

Demsetz, H (1973) The Market Concentration Doctrine: An Examination of Evidence and a Discussion of Policy, AEI-Hoover Policy Study 7, Washington DC. http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/GAI/Readings/Economics%20Institute/Demsetz_Market%
20Concentration%20Doctrine.pdf

Industry Commission (1991) Costs and Benefits of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Inquiry Report No. 15, November.

Productivity Commission (2021) Vulnerable Supply Chains, Study Report, Canberra.

—— (2023a) 5-year Productivity Inquiry: Advancing Prosperity, Inquiry Report no. 100, Canberra.

—— (2023b) Submission to the Inquiry into promoting economic dynamism, competition and business formation, Canberra.

—— (2023c) Trade and assistance review 2021-22, Annual report series, Canberra.

—— (2023d) Productivity growth and wages – a forensic look, PC Productivity insights, Canberra, September.

Robson, A (2011) Law and Markets, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Footnotes

  1. PC (2023a) Return to text
  2. ABS Cat No. 5206.0 https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/national-accounts/australian-national-accounts-national-income-expenditure-and-product/latest-release Return to text
  3. https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2023/sp-gov-2023-09-07.html Return to text
  4. PC (2023d) Return to text
  5. As set out in our submission, economic dynamism is concerned with “the efficient adaptation to new demand and supply trends and re-organisation of resources (labour and capital) across the economy, supported by the creation of new knowledge and its rapid diffusion.” Return to text
  6. PC (2023b) Return to text
  7. See Demsetz (1973) Return to text
  8. See, for example, Robson (2011), chapter 10 Return to text
  9. ABS Cat No. 6401.0 https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/consumer-price-index-australia/latest-release Return to text
  10. ABS Cat No. 5676.0 https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/business-indicators/business-indicators-australia/latest-release Return to text
  11. PC (1991) Return to text
  12. PC (2021) Return to text
  13. PC (2023c) Return to text
  14. Statement by the Prime Minister the Hon PJ Keating MP, 25 August 1993. https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/original/00008945.pdf Return to text
  15. https://assets.pc.gov.au/about/core-functions/competitive-neutrality/commonwealth-competitive-neutrality-policy-statement-1996.pdf Return to text
  16. https://assets.pc.gov.au/about/core-functions/competitive-neutrality/2004-competitive-neutrality-guidelines-for-managers.pdf Return to text
  17. The Recommendation was formally adopted on 31st May 2021 at the Ministerial Council Meeting. All OECD members have adhered. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0462#adherents Return to text
  18. See Commonwealth of Australia (2015). https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/Competition-policy-review-report_online.pdf. The Commonwealth undertook a review in 2017. https://consult.treasury.gov.au/competitive-neutrality-review Return to text

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