The contribution to public policy of Professor Richard Hal Snape (1936-2002)

Chairman's speech

An Eulogy by Gary Banks, Chairman, Productivity Commission, delivered at Armadale Uniting Church, Melbourne, Tuesday 8 October 2002.

Richard Hal Snape: Emeritus Professor of Monash University, Deputy Chairman of the Productivity Commission, Board Member of the Australian Research Council, Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences and, most recently, Distinguished Fellow of the Economic Society of Australia.

Professor Richard Snape was just 65 years old when he was taken from us. That is not a long life by conventional standards. But measured in terms of his accomplishments, Richard led both a long and exemplary life. And his contribution will endure, not only on the strength of his considerable intellectual output, but also through the influence he has had on policy-makers, and on younger generations of economists.

Richard Snape's professional contribution began earlier than most. In 1960, with a first class honours degree in commerce from Melbourne University behind him, he entered the London School of Economics on a scholarship. Under the supervision of Basil Yamey he completed his doctorate in just two years, producing an innovative and incisive analysis of the welfare costs of barriers to international trade in sugar.

It soon became clear that the young Richard Snape was destined for great things when the doyen of the economics profession, the redoubtable Harry Johnson, was stimulated by Richard's thesis to publish an article sub-titled 'Variations on a theme by R.H. Snape'. As Jonathan Pincus has remarked, in one of many letters of support for Richard's recent successful nomination as Distinguished Fellow:

'What a splendid launch: Richard's name in the title of a publication almost before he had a publication to his name!'

The only misgiving that Richard may have had about this brilliant debut, which included highly rated journal articles of his own, was that he thereby acquired the nickname 'Sugar Snape', which stuck with him for some considerable time!

Richard's research and publications record soon transcended even these auspicious beginnings. Returning to Australia in 1962, he took up a position as lecturer at the fledgling Monash University, where he and other young lions of the profession – most with freshly minted doctorates from prestigious overseas universities – soon made the Faculty of Economics and Politics the pre-eminent centre for the 'new economics' in Australia.

Another of those youthful academics was Alan A Powell, now also an Emeritus Professor. Alan will speak about Richard's considerable achievements at Monash University in an academic career spanning some 35 years.

In the time available, my own remarks will focus on Richard Snape's influence on public policy, and the contribution that he has thereby made to enhancing the welfare of the community – the end purpose of an economist's training.

As a specialist in international trade and the economics of protection, it was natural that Richard Snape would choose to make his first real foray into the policy arena at the Tariff Board. Richard was among a group of young academics – including Max Corden, Fred Gruen, Alan Powell and Garry Pursell – who in the mid-1960s helped the Tariff Board under its new Chairman G A (Alf) Rattigan develop a proper economic framework for tariff-making. Bill Carmichael, who played a key role at the Tariff Board in bringing this external expertise to bear, recalls Richard Snape taking the lead in organising a joint letter from academics to the newspapers, supporting the Tariff Board in its attempts to broaden its reporting in the face of staunch opposition from the Government.

This is an early example of what a number of Richard's colleagues have identified as his concern not just for academic rigour, but to use his analytical skills to help produce practical results; and to stand up publicly and be counted.

Richard's next foray into public policy required him to take leave from his academic duties in 1973-74 to be on the Priorities Review Staff under the Whitlam Government. The PRS was an institutional innovation designed to bring fresh analytical insights to policy development for the benefit of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. In his letter supporting Richard for Distinguished Fellow, Michael Porter recalls that Richard took responsibility within the PRS for trade and assistance policy, anti-competitive regulation and energy policy (an area which, under Rex Connor, had particular need of Richard's careful analysis).

The reports of the PRS were highly influential on public debate and policy outcomes during its short life. Its reports on industry regulation and adjustment policy are still influential today.

In the late 1970s, under a different Government, Richard Snape was appointed to the Treasurer's Panel of Economists and then to his Economic Advisory Group. Ian Macfarlane, Governor of the Reserve Bank – and, like many of us, a former student of Richard's – has recounted the opinion of a previous Treasury Secretary that Richard's contribution at that time to the debate on the relationship between real wages and unemployment, while not widely recognised, was in fact 'more valuable than anyone else's', and that he had been so impressed that he had attempted to hire him.

This illustrates another facet of Richard's contribution. While rightly confident about his analytical ability and forthright in expressing and defending his views, Richard Snape's main concern was to advance the arguments, not himself.

In subsequent years, Richard returned to the Tariff Board's successor, the Industries Assistance Commission, as a consultant, often on complex conceptual issues. Perhaps the standout contribution in this respect was a 1985 consultancy for the IAC that he undertook with Gary Sampson, developing a framework for analysing barriers to international trade in services. This work soon reached an international audience and eventually became the foundation on which the General Agreement on Trade in Services was built during the Uruguay Round.

As a consultant, Richard upheld the finest traditions of academic independence. Unlike many so-called independent consultants today, Richard always delivered what he believed to be sound advice, not merely what his sponsor may have wanted to hear. Thus in the mid-1980s when the Trade Minister of the day was seeking to justify a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Richard produced a robust but inconvenient report, making it plain that such a course would not necessarily be economically beneficial. (Since then, other consultancies have been enlisted on this matter, but Richard Snape's original work is still commonly referred to.)

In this period, Richard also made his mark at a number of international institutions, including stints at the UNCTAD and the World Bank. More recently he also made an important direct contribution to the work of the WTO, as a member of an eminent international panel reviewing aspects of India's import protection regime. Garry Pursell notes:

'Richard was the only economist on the panel and he contributed in key ways to the carefully reasoned findings against the Indian Government's position … which were welcomed by domestic supporters of trade liberalisation in India … and established a very important precedent on this issue at the WTO.'

Richard's skills as an editor and editorial adviser for an array of professional journals and publications — including Australia's own Economic Record — were also sought by the World Bank. A number of those acquainted with Richard's work as editor of the World Bank's Economic Review and Research Observer have remarked on the way in which he quickly established the reputation and reach of these new journals. Nicholas Hope has recalled his regrets at the time that Richard could not be persuaded to stay on at the Bank in a more direct policy role, choosing instead to return to Australia.

Nick Hope records his subsequent delight, however, in learning that this had enabled Richard eventually to assume such a role in Australia at the Productivity Commission.

Richard Snape was appointed to the then Industry Commission in 1995 as an Associate Commissioner. He was brought in primarily as a research leader and mentor, but he soon became active and expert in all aspects of the Commission's work. As a result, he was appointed Commissioner in the newly (re-)created Productivity Commission in 1998 and, following my own appointment as Chairman, he was made Deputy Chairman.

Richard initially worked on public inquiries and research with a trade policy or industry assistance orientation. His knowledge in that area, together with his capacity to grasp the essentials of an argument and to understand the circumstances and motivation of 'interested parties', are all reflected in the quality of those early reports, one of which has become a model internationally for how WTO 'safeguard' investigations should be conducted.

In the next few years, Richard headed key national inquiries into important areas of public policy outside the traditional industry assistance domain. These included reports to government on the regulation of international air services, broadcasting, telecommunications (as supporting Commissioner) and airports. Richard brought his customary analytical rigour to each of those reports, as well as a level-headed appreciation not only of the potential costs of market power, but also of the limits of regulation in achieving better outcomes.

Alan Mitchell, writing about Richard in last weekend's Financial Review, observed:

'His most recent major reports for the Productivity Commission included airports and broadcasting. The Government has accepted most of the wisdom of the airports report and is still trying to evade the wisdom of the broadcasting report.'

As I read those words on Saturday, I could almost hear Richard chuckling in appreciation.

Richard took a keen interest in the Press as a vehicle for promoting policy ideas and influencing public opinion. He delighted in a good story about our reports. And he would get very annoyed if a reporter got it wrong. This, unfortunately, was not an infrequent occurrence. On a number of such occasions Richard gave the hapless reporter a stern talking to.

Richard could be tougher still if the offender happened to be an academic, and indeed if he perceived any lapse in academic standards or conduct. Ian Harper has recounted with feeling an earlier and quite innocent experience of his own, noting 'the rebuke of one's professional senior is carried throughout one's career and passed on to the next generation!'

This brings me back finally to the influence that Richard has had, and continues to have, through the work of those students and colleagues who have benefited from his guidance and collaboration. At the Productivity Commission, Richard's door was always open to junior and senior staff alike; he was always willing to help and his support was always timely. Richard's interest in staff went well beyond guiding their work. He also took a keen interest in their professional development and would encourage those with potential to exploit it to the full.

As Philip Williams has remarked from personal experience, Richard's guidance and support for his students was not a temporary thing, but involved a long-term commitment. He writes:

'One of the characteristics of good teachers is that they succeed in transferring their enthusiasm for their subject to their students. It is not so common for this to continue for decades after the student-teacher relationship has ended.'

For my own part, it is hard to express how privileged I have felt to have been able to work alongside Richard in common cause over these past few years. And, during his last difficult year, it has been inspiring and humbling to observe Richard's continuing contribution to our work and to have had his unfailing support.

In a sense, those of us who worked with Richard are all his pupils. The standards he set for himself are standards to which we should all aspire. Through his own substantial intellectual achievements and the influence of his teaching, Australia is a better and more prosperous place.

Gary Banks
8 October 2002

Opening statement

15 September 2023

Deputy Chair Alex Robson delivered an opening statement to the House of Representatives economics committee inquiry into promoting economic dynamism, competition and business formation.

Download the opening statement

Competition, dynamism and productivity (PDF 191 KB)

Read the opening statement

Thank you for the invitation to appear again before this Committee, and for the opportunity to make an opening statement.

When we last appeared before this Committee, our Advancing Prosperity ¹ report had not yet been publicly released, so today I will spend a bit of time discussing that. I will also discuss some recent productivity trends, the relationship between productivity and real wages, and some trends in indicators of market dynamism as set out in our submission. I will conclude by touching upon the topic of competitive neutrality.

My main messages today are as follows:

Australia’s productivity performance has been anaemic for quite some time.
Productivity growth is a key driver of real wages growth.
Competition and business dynamism are, in turn, important drivers of productivity growth.
Several aggregate indicators suggest that competition and dynamism in Australia may be declining.
However, these aggregate indicators should be interpreted with care, particularly when it comes to the menu of policies that might address those trends, and the tradeoffs that might be involved.
There is no single policy silver bullet in relation to competition, dynamism and productivity.
A comprehensive microeconomic reform agenda – of the kind outlined in our recent Advancing Prosperity report – is needed.
Finally, we consider there is scope to improve Australia’s Competitive Neutrality policy and make it fit for purpose for the years and decades ahead.

Recent productivity trends

In March this year we released our 5-year productivity report, Advancing Prosperity. The report emphasised the fact that over the decade to 2020, Australia’s productivity growth averaged just 1.1% per year – the slowest growth rate in 60 years.

Since that report was released, there have been several disappointing data releases on productivity. The recent data underscores our earlier key messages.

For example, the most recent National Accounts data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics shows that over the year to June, Australia’s level of productivity went backwards, declining by 3.6%. ² That data also shows that productivity has declined in four of the last five quarters. As a result, GDP per hour worked is now at its lowest level since March 2016.

The outgoing Governor of the RBA recently warned that Australia’s living standards could stagnate in the face of our weak productivity performance. ³ Another view is that on current data trends, we would be lucky to achieve stagnation – it could turn out be another optimistic, “glass half full” prediction from the former Governor.

My own view is that Australia’s productivity challenge is urgent – but it did not happen overnight. It has been an urgent problem for many years. We can and must do better, but there is a way forward.

Productivity and real wages

Why does it matter? Productivity is about working smarter – not harder or longer. The recent data underscores this.

If the level of productivity is falling – as it has been over the past year – this means that on average, Australians had to work more hours just to produce and buy the same volume of goods and services.

In other words, over the past year, Australians on average have been working harder and longer – in effect, running to stand still. Real wages have also been going backwards, and this is no coincidence. Indeed, one of the very first findings in Advancing Prosperity is that in Australia, almost all sustained increases in real wages are underpinned by improvements in labour productivity growth.

Productivity Commission research released today ⁴ confirms this. This research examines so-called ‘wage decoupling’ – defined as average annual labour productivity growth minus average annual producer wage growth. We find that since 1995, only two sectors have exhibited strong wage decoupling: mining (4.9 percentage points) and agriculture (3.4 percentage points).

These two commodity-exporting – and highly productive – sectors account for just 4% of total employment, but around 18% of total value added. They therefore have a disproportionate impact on economy‑wide estimates of wage decoupling.

If we strip them out and examine the rest of the economy, average decoupling since 1995 has been just 0.1 percentage points. And in more than half of the sectors outside of mining and agriculture, decoupling was zero or negative.

In other words, since 1995 the wages of over 95% of Australia’s working population have risen very closely in line with productivity. And the average income gain from a productivity lift is more than eight times the potential gain from eliminating the limited decoupling across most of the economy. So productivity growth remains the main policy game.

Indicators of market dynamism

Given this, what should we do about our weak productivity performance? This committee is rightly focused on competition and market dynamism. ⁵

In a market-based economy like Australia, it is reasonable to expect that there would be a close link between competition, dynamism and productivity.

Business decisions are driven by the pursuit of profit and the avoidance of losses. Market prices guide those decisions, and are “a signal wrapped up in an incentive”, providing information to businesses about hiring decisions, where it invest, what to produce, how much to produce, when to sell it, where to sell, and to whom.

Well-functioning markets and healthy competition between businesses lead to lower prices, higher quality goods and services, greater consumer choice, and ultimately higher living standards.

However, if competitive forces are dulled or distorted, this can lead to incorrect price signals being provided, and poor outcomes for consumers and workers.

Australia’s economy and our markets are changing. Markets for services – which tend to be relatively labour intensive – now dominate, with 80% of activity and 90% of employment now in services. And many services are delivered without benefit of either the signal or incentives of markets. In many instances, labour is the service – think of health, aged care and disability care.

I will return to these points a bit later.

Our submission to this inquiry ⁶ focusses on a range of data which are proxies for market dynamism: firm entry and exit, concentration, price-markups, labour market mobility and investment.

Let me highlight some the key points of our submission in relation to these proxies.

While aggregate firm entry and exit rates can be an indicator of ‘creative destruction’ in the economy, they are not necessarily suggestive of broader underlying trends regarding dynamism.
Measures of market concentration – such as the four firm concentration (CR4) index or the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) – should be interpreted with a great deal of care, particularly at the aggregate level.
- Indeed, the proposition that market concentration by itself must be negatively associated with productivity growth and economic well-being has been questioned by economists for at least 50 years. ⁷ As a matter of economic theory, it is straightforward to derive examples where a higher HHI (an indicator of greater market concentration) is associated with higher – rather than lower – overall economic wellbeing. ⁸ And in practice, as our submission discusses, the link between concentration and wellbeing greatly depends on the economic context.
- In any case, at the industry level, our analysis of concentration dynamics shows that most Australian industries are not concentrated, and very few of became concentrated from 2006 to 2021. Moreover, the distribution of concentration measures across industries was relatively stable between 2006 and 2021.

Thus, the claim that the Australian economy is as a whole becoming more concentrated does not seem to hold up. Most Australian industries are not highly concentrated, and this has not changed much.
Related to this, firm mark ups – the gap between price and marginal cost – are often pointed to as indicators of market power and weak dynamism. There is some evidence that markups have been increasing in Australia.
- However, this evidence is plagued by measurement issues. And, from a policy perspective, interpreting aggregate evidence on markups is not straightforward.
- For example, if costs and prices are falling together (so that consumers are better off) but prices fall at a slower rate (so that markups rise), what is the appropriate policy response?
- Or, to take another example, in the presence of large fixed costs (due, for example, to high up front capital costs), a gap between price and marginal cost may be required simply for a business to break even. In the presence of high fixed costs, higher markups could, in principle, even be associated with lower profits.

Some have gone further and claimed that “greedflation” abounds at the aggregate level in Australia, with firms across the economy using the recent increase in inflation to ‘unfairly’ mark-up prices over costs and increase profits.
- The Commission does not agree with this claim. As our submission notes, overall, aggregate evidence does not suggest that high price margins associated with exploitation of market power have played a significant role in accentuating the higher input costs and supply constraints that precipitated the current inflationary episode.

Indeed, some may counter that the greedflation thesis seems to have been quickly overtaken by the facts.
- Australia’s annual inflation rate appears to have peaked at 7.8% and has now declined to 6%. ⁹
- Company profits declined by 13.1% in the June 2023 quarter, and fell by 11.8% over the year to June. ¹⁰
- Some might ask: if there is greedflation, why were firms apparently greedy up until recently, but have now suddenly stopped being greedy?

As discussed at our appearance before this committee earlier in the year, an inflationary environment should not give businesses new opportunities for sustained exploitation of market power – if they possess this power, they will exploit it at any time.
- And, consistent with our work on wage decoupling, our submission to this inquiry notes that stripping mining out of the corporate profits data indicates that profits have been stable as a share of total factor income. In fact, overall profits as a share of factor income declined to 30.2% in the June 2023 quarter, the lowest level since December 2021

To conclude on indicators of dynamism: while there are some indications that dynamism may be declining in Australia, it is difficult to draw specific policy implications from the data.

Advancing prosperity

However, the answer is not to sit back and declare that it is all too hard. On the contrary, there are several policy measures that the Commission believes would stack the odds in favour of greater competition and dynamism in Australia, and which would give us the best chance of meeting and overcoming our productivity challenge.

Some commentators have said that we should focus on a narrow set of policies – climate, technology and supply chains. These are obviously important, but we think the reform agenda is much broader.

In any case, it may come as a surprise to these commentators that the Commission and its predecessors have been thought-leaders in climate policy for more than three decades, with our first publication on the costs and benefits of emissions reductions appearing in 1991. ¹¹

For all the talk about supply chains, as far as I am aware, our 2021 report on Vulnerable Supply Chains ¹² remains the only rigorous, evidence-based analysis of that issue in Australia.

And of course, our annual Trade and Assistance Review ¹³ – now in its 49th year – provides up-to-date and cutting edge analysis of industry assistance and trade policy developments.

Advancing Prosperity sets out 71 policy recommendations across 29 reform directives. Our policy recommendations fall into five general areas:

Building an adaptable workforce to supply the skilled workers for Australia’s future economy.
Harnessing data, digital technology and diffusion to capture the dividend of new ideas.
Creating a more dynamic economy through fostering competition, efficiency and contestability in markets.
Lifting productivity in the non-market sector to deliver high quality services at the lowest cost.
Securing net-zero at least cost to limit the productivity impact caused by climate change.

Our report also sets out a detailed prioritisation framework and implementation roadmap for meeting and overcoming our productivity predicament.

Many of recommendations are directly or indirectly related to competition and market dynamism, particularly given the changing structure of Australia’s economy towards services. For example in a service-based economy, fit for purpose labour market regulation is key, particularly in relation to the gig economy, which can be an important source of market entry, innovation and dynamism.

For the most part, real wages and productivity move together. Finding productivity improvements leads to increases in real wages. So labour market settings need to facilitate and indeed maximise cooperation between parties and encourage innovation, reward aspiration and effort, and preserve fairness.

Shoehorning platform work into other employment categories would put at risk its productivity impacts and its benefits for gig workers. But gig workers have genuine concerns that need to be taken very seriously. Improved safety protection and access to dispute resolution are warranted.

Our migration policy settings should be viewed through a productivity lens and focus on the composition of the intake at least as much as the aggregate quantum. In this regard, we think there is great merit in moving towards a system that places a greater emphasis on employer nomination, and less of a reliance on skill lists.

Reforms to occupational licensing arrangements would also assist with the better allocation and matching of scarce labour resources across the economy.

On digital infrastructure, we think there needs to be better regional internet connectivity, as well as policies in place to ensure that there is more transparency around digital infrastructure funding decisions and evaluation of previous investments.

And the market for internet connectivity may now be sufficiently developed to allow for a more competitive method of allocating funds.

Openness to trade, investment and international migration are key drivers of market dynamism and prosperity more generally. We recommend getting rid of our remaining tariffs, and progressively removing Australia’s anti-dumping and countervailing measures, and subjecting any new measures to an economywide cost benefit test.

We should increasingly accept product standards adopted in other leading economies as ‘deemed to comply’ with Australian standards. And we could bring application fees for proposed FDI into agricultural land assets closer into line with other forms of investment.

On taxation, we recommend a suite of reforms. In addition to abolishing Australia’s remaining tariffs, we also recommend abolishing stamp duty on insurance premiums, moving towards a more system of efficient road user pricing, and moving away from taxes that discourage encourage efficient asset transfers and capital allocation, such as stamp duty on property transactions.

Related to this, our systems of business and industrial planning and zoning could be improved, with an eye towards encouraging greater geographic competition between businesses. And there is scope for state and territory governments to improve public transport pricing arrangements.

Finally, on merger policy: we conclude that overall, there does not appear to be a strong case for the implementation of a new formal authorisation regime, of the kind proposed by the former chair of the ACCC. Instead, we think there may be more value in the ACCC further considering its internal merger review processes; and for government to consider how best to avoid perverse incentives across merger clearance procedures.

Competitive Neutrality Policy

To conclude, I would like to mention one aspect of the Commission’s responsibilities that we believe warrants a close look, and which could benefit from reform: the area of Competitive Neutrality.

It has been 30 years since the Hilmer Report on National Competition Policy – which was introduced by Prime Minister Keating as an “important contribution towards furthering competition policy in Australia”. ¹⁴

A key part of the Hilmer report dealt with the principle of competitive neutrality – the proposition that state-owned enterprises and private businesses should compete on a level playing field. Competitive neutrality (CN) policy is also concerned with government businesses that may compete with each other.

It has long been recognised that favourable conditions for government enterprises in relation to their private sector counterparts can distort all kinds of economic decisions – particularly around innovation, investment and hiring, ultimately leading to suboptimal outcomes for consumers and workers.

Those artificial cost advantages can also lead to resources (capital and labour) flowing to government businesses simply because of their government ownership rather than them being the most efficient (productive) users of resources. Where these resource allocation distortions occur, the nation’s productivity suffers.

The principle of competitive neutrality is likely to become increasingly important, particularly given the growth of the non-market sector (for example, in the care economy) and the re-entry of governments into some of the economy’s “commanding heights”, such as energy and telecommunications.

The Government's approach to operationalising CN principles is set out in the 1996 Competitive Neutrality Policy Statement ¹⁵ and the Competitive Neutrality Guidelines for Managers. ¹⁶ Unfortunately, Australian Government businesses sometimes fail to comply with these obligations and guidelines.

An integral part of competitive neutrality policy and its implementation is a competitive neutrality complaints handling mechanism, which is intended to bring some discipline to the implementation of competitive neutrality and provide ongoing accountability.

The Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office – the AGCNCO, a separate unit within the Commission – is that mechanism. It deals with any complaints and provides independent advice to Government following its investigations.

Any individual, organisation or government body with an interest in the application of competitive neutrality may lodge a complaint. While governments are not obliged to accept the AGCNCO’s advice, we think there needs to be a strong cop on the beat in relation to competitive neutrality.

However, although our competitive neutrality policy has served Australia well over the last three decades, it is deficient in several areas. To name just a few:

Australia’s competitive neutrality policy lacks a credible enforcement regime.
There is a lack of guidance on what a public interest test should embody and what it should look like.
There are poor processes to ensure compliance with the policy by start-up government businesses.
There is little guidance or principles on what constitutes ‘government’ in significant government business activities.
There is little guidance on what policy or complaints process should apply for business activities with multiple government owners.
There is no mention of the full range of possible material competitive advantages (other than those relating to tax, debt and regulatory neutrality and earning a commercial rate of return), and poor guidance on methodologies for estimating the value of some advantages.
There is an absence of guidance on whether any identified cost advantages should be addressed by the imposition of a CN adjustment payment, or by directly addressing the source of the advantage.
There is a need to reformulate the commerciality test in CN policy.

Australia recently signed up to the OECD’s Recommendation on Competitive Neutrality. ¹⁷ In light of this renewed commitment, and given this Committee’s – and the Government’s – focus on competition and dynamism, it may be an appropriate time to look more closely Australia’s competitive neutrality regime, with an eye to reform.

In this respect we support the earlier findings of the Competition Policy Review ¹⁸ (the Harper report), which recommended all Australian governments should review their competitive neutrality policies and complaint handling mechanisms to ensure they remain fit for purpose in the 21st century.

The Government’s recently announced two-year Competition Policy Review may provide a further opportunity to examine competitive neutrality policy.

References

Commonwealth of Australia (2015) Competition Policy Review, Final Report, March.

Demsetz, H (1973) The Market Concentration Doctrine: An Examination of Evidence and a Discussion of Policy, AEI-Hoover Policy Study 7, Washington DC. http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/GAI/Readings/Economics%20Institute/Demsetz_Market%
20Concentration%20Doctrine.pdf

Industry Commission (1991) Costs and Benefits of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Inquiry Report No. 15, November.

Productivity Commission (2021) Vulnerable Supply Chains, Study Report, Canberra.

—— (2023a) 5-year Productivity Inquiry: Advancing Prosperity, Inquiry Report no. 100, Canberra.

—— (2023b) Submission to the Inquiry into promoting economic dynamism, competition and business formation, Canberra.

—— (2023c) Trade and assistance review 2021-22, Annual report series, Canberra.

—— (2023d) Productivity growth and wages – a forensic look, PC Productivity insights, Canberra, September.

Robson, A (2011) Law and Markets, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Footnotes

PC (2023a) Return to text
ABS Cat No. 5206.0 https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/national-accounts/australian-national-accounts-national-income-expenditure-and-product/latest-release Return to text
https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2023/sp-gov-2023-09-07.html Return to text
PC (2023d) Return to text
As set out in our submission, economic dynamism is concerned with “the efficient adaptation to new demand and supply trends and re-organisation of resources (labour and capital) across the economy, supported by the creation of new knowledge and its rapid diffusion.” Return to text
PC (2023b) Return to text
See Demsetz (1973) Return to text
See, for example, Robson (2011), chapter 10 Return to text
ABS Cat No. 6401.0 https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/consumer-price-index-australia/latest-release Return to text
ABS Cat No. 5676.0 https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/business-indicators/business-indicators-australia/latest-release Return to text
PC (1991) Return to text
PC (2021) Return to text
PC (2023c) Return to text
Statement by the Prime Minister the Hon PJ Keating MP, 25 August 1993. https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/original/00008945.pdf Return to text
https://assets.pc.gov.au/about/core-functions/competitive-neutrality/commonwealth-competitive-neutrality-policy-statement-1996.pdf Return to text
https://assets.pc.gov.au/about/core-functions/competitive-neutrality/2004-competitive-neutrality-guidelines-for-managers.pdf Return to text
The Recommendation was formally adopted on 31st May 2021 at the Ministerial Council Meeting. All OECD members have adhered. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0462#adherents Return to text
See Commonwealth of Australia (2015). https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/Competition-policy-review-report_online.pdf. The Commonwealth undertook a review in 2017. https://consult.treasury.gov.au/competitive-neutrality-review Return to text