

The augmented link also affects other links in the network and the activities of generators at other nodes in the network. For example, as in Scenario 1, at peak load all plants operate and node N2 supplies electricity into the network. However, the amount that node N2 supplies at peak load is less than the amount it supplies in Scenario 1, since more can be supplied by the lower cost plants at nodes N1 and N4. Similarly, the amount that node N2 supplies at intermediate load is smaller than the amount it supplies in the base case. Although node N2 still supplies electricity to node N3, this electricity is not all produced at N2. Rather, node N2 produces some electricity but also receives electricity from node N1 to be supplied indirectly to node N3. Finally, at base load, node N4 can now supply more electricity directly to node N3 than it could in the base case, which lessens the amount that is supplied to node N3 from node N1.


### *Merit order for plant dispatch*

The modelling also provides the merit order for dispatch of generators at the generating nodes under the different scenarios (see figure 5.6).

In both scenarios, power stations are dispatched in order of marginal cost at the node — that is from least cost to high cost. For example, at node N1, the base/intermediate plant node, supplies electricity over all loads. Here the low cost power stations, P2coal1 and P3coal1, are dispatched first then P1coal1 is dispatched and finally the higher cost power station, P4gasol, is dispatched. Node N4, another base/intermediate plant node, follows a similar pattern. Finally, at node N2, peaking plant is not dispatched at base load, but is dispatched in peak periods.

The augmentation of the transmission system affects both the timing of dispatch of various plants and the amount of power produced by plants at all nodes in the network. At node N4, the total supply increases in all periods and the mix in supply by individual generators changes. For example, after augmentation, generator P10coal1 supplies electricity in all periods (as it did in Scenario 1), but the amount it supplies increases and P12gasol only supplies after augmentation. The effect on generation at nodes directly effected by the link is also seen at node N1. Here the node becomes a net importer in all time periods — while in Scenario 1 it was a net importer at peak loads and a net exporter at base loads — drawing from the increased output of node N4. As discussed earlier, augmentation also affects nodes that are not directly tied to the link. For example after augmentation, node N2 still acts as a peaking plant node, but it is dispatched later, and supplies less electricity than it did in Scenario 1.

Figure 5.6: Merit order for plant dispatch, various scenarios



The income earned by the transmission system is given by the merchandising surplus — this is the difference between the value of sales of electricity sold by the network (exports) and the value of sales purchased the network (imports). The source of this income is the shadow cost or imputed cost congestion from transmission lines that are constraining the network and the rent earned on transmission because marginal losses are higher than average losses.

Chao and Peck (1996) propose a system to allocate these rents to each transmission line, taking into account the network externality caused by Kirchoff's laws. This method takes into account that injecting power or withdrawing power at any node make a contribution to the whole systems marginal losses and any transmission constraints on links.

Although we have been able to replicate the method published by Chao and Peck (1996) using our modelling framework, we have not been able to replicate it for the example presented here. We suspect that there may be an intertemporal dimension introduced here because our example has 34 load periods which are interdependent via generation. In the Chao and Peck (1996) approach, the difference between nodal prices is decomposed into three components, representing contributions to system congestion costs, marginal transmission losses and the increase in energy purchased because energy losses.

## **5.10 Conclusion and further research**

The model presented here provides insights into economic issues arising in electricity markets. It has integrated demand, transmission and generation into a single model to simulate the economically efficient operation of an electricity market.

The framework could be developed to further explore pricing issues in electricity markets. For example, introducing transmission capacity along each node as a variable, including its annualised fixed cost in the objective function. This would make transmission capacity along each node endogenous in the model, thereby allowing for simultaneous optimisation of demand, transmission capacity and generation.

Other examples are to extend to a multi-year model to evaluate long term dynamic effects on the market, such as the timing of transmission and generation augmentation, or investigate pricing rules to determine transmission fees along each link that are consistent with an economically efficient market, taking into account the network externality. This is an extension of the research by Chao and Peck (1996).

Table 5.3: Income earned by the whole transmission system in each load block (\$m)

<i>Load block</i>	<i>Scenario 1</i>			<i>Scenario 2</i>		
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Congestion</i>	<i>Losses</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Congestion</i>	<i>Losses</i>
B1	0.74	0.11	0.63	1.06	0	1.06
B2	1.51	1.32	0.19	0.33	0	0.33
B3	1.98	1.65	0.33	0.57	0	0.57
B4	0.43	0	0.43	0.73	0	0.73
B5	0.74	0	0.74	1.24	0	1.24
B6	0.74	0.23	0.51	0.86	0	0.86
B7	0.76	0	0.76	1.28	0	1.28
B8	8.76	7.83	0.93	1.63	0	1.63
B9	0.94	0	0.94	1.57	0	1.57
B10	1.24	0	1.24	2.07	0	2.07
B11	1.52	0	1.52	2.52	0	2.52
B12	2.34	0	2.34	3.89	0	3.89
B13	1.97	0	1.97	3.27	0	3.27
B14	11.6	9.59	2	3.49	0	3.49
B15	2.58	0	2.58	4.46	0	4.46
B16	2.42	0	2.42	4.29	0	4.29
B17	13.65	11.94	1.71	3.24	0	3.24
B18	7.44	6.11	1.33	2.51	0	2.51
B19	4.53	3.4	1.13	2.13	0	2.13
B20	3.73	2.81	0.92	1.58	0	1.58
B21	3.37	2.55	0.82	1.26	0	1.26
B22	3.31	2.51	0.8	1.12	0	1.12
B23	3.2	2.43	0.77	0.98	0	0.98
B24	3.19	2.41	0.77	0.81	0	0.81
B25	0.64	0	0.64	0.83	0	0.83
B26	0.31	0	0.31	0.48	0	0.48
B27	0.35	0	0.35	0.63	0	0.63
B28	0.26	0	0.26	0.47	0	0.47
B29	0.2	0	0.2	0.45	0	0.45
B30	0.26	0	0.26	0.58	0	0.58
B31	0.2	0	0.2	0.45	0	0.45
B32	0.14	0	0.14	0.32	0	0.32
B33	0.1	0	0.1	0.24	0	0.24
B34	0.07	0	0.07	0.18	0	0.18
Total	85.22	54.89	30.31	51.52	0	51.52

## Appendix A: GAMS code for the model

```

$offsymlist offsymxref
OPTIONS DECIMALS = 5;
OPTIONS LIMCOL =0;
OPTIONS LIMROW =0;
*OPTIONS SOLPRINT = OFF;
OPTIONS NLP = MINOS5;
OPTIONS SYSOUT = OFF;
OPTIONS ITERLIM = 20000;
OPTIONS RESLIM = 8000;

SETS
B LOAD BLOCKS
  / B1 * B34 /
N NODES
  / N1 * N4 /;
ALIAS (B,BP), (N,NP);

SETS
GR(N) NODES WHERE THERE IS GENERATION
  / N1, N2, N4 /

P GENERATING PLANTS
  / P1COAL1, P2COAL1, P3COAL1, P4GASOL, P5GASOC, P6GASCC,
    P7DIST, P8COAL1, P9COAL1, P10COAL1, P11COAL1, P12GASOL/
NG(N,P) THE PLANTS AT EACH NODE
  /N1.(P1COAL1, P2COAL1, P3COAL1, P4GASOL)
    N2.(P5GASOC, P6GASCC)
    N3.(P7DIST)
    N4.(P8COAL1, P9COAL1, P10COAL1, P11COAL1, P12GASOL)/
D(N) NODES WHERE THERE IS DEMAND
  / N1, N3 /
LK(N,NP) LINK BETWEEN EACH NODE IN THE NETWORK
  /N1.(N2, N3, N4)
    N2.(N1, N3)
    N3.(N1, N2, N4)
    N4.(N1, N3)/
NT(N) NODES THAT ARE NOT NODE N4
  /N1, N2, N3/

LABELS NAMES TO IDENTIFY PLANT DATA
  / UNITS      NO OF UNITS AT EACH PLANT
    AVAIL      AVAILABILITY OF EACH PLANT
    GENMIN     MINIMUM CAPACITY OF GENERATORS
    GENMAX     MAXIMUM CAPACITY OF GENERATORS
    FUELCOST   FUELCOSTS ($ per MWh)
    CAPCOST    CAPITAL COST ($mill PER MW)
    LIFE       LIFE OF UNITS (years)/;

* ELEMENTS UNDERLYING DEMAND AT EACH NODE
TABLE DMD(B,N) DATA FOR LOAD AT EACH NODE IN EACH BLOCK (MW)
      N1      N3
B1    6500    2909.29
B2    6400    2814.83
B3    6300    2795.82
B4    6200    2785.80
B5    6100    2761.74
B6    6000    2724.57
B7    5900    2696.79

```

B8	5800	2644.10
B9	5700	2646.52
B10	5600	2617.59
B11	5500	2609.79
B12	5400	2600.58
B13	5300	2541.84
B14	5200	2472.71
B15	5100	2485.65
B16	5000	2436.29
B17	4900	2370.75
B18	4800	2321.46
B19	4700	2303.01
B20	4600	2247.04
B21	4500	2188.80
B22	4400	2149.72
B23	4300	2074.14
B24	4200	2029.16
B25	4100	1979.27
B26	4000	1912.78
B27	3900	1858.47
B28	3800	1794.04
B29	3700	1742.41
B30	3600	1676.24
B31	3500	1633.05
B32	3400	1583.99
B33	3300	1538.78
B34	3200	1463.29 ;

TABLE ENERGY(B,N) DATA FOR ENERGY AT EACH NODE IN EACH BLOCK (GWh)

	N1	N3
B1	246.42	107.45
B2	84.02	36.69
B3	151.70	66.82
B4	203.48	90.79
B5	360.99	162.01
B6	275.79	124.31
B7	438.85	199.21
B8	609.98	275.74
B9	624.37	287.49
B10	920.31	426.53
B11	1241.37	584.02
B12	2107.88	1005.71
B13	2195.53	1043.74
B14	2702.30	1273.22
B15	3400.93	1641.72
B16	3249.15	1566.77
B17	2432.17	1164.07
B18	2254.98	1079.34
B19	2094.40	1015.72
B20	1716.95	829.93
B21	1551.76	746.60
B22	1509.13	728.60
B23	1454.50	693.97
B24	1458.99	696.56
B25	1497.75	713.83
B26	854.03	403.11
B27	1114.64	524.91
B28	820.00	381.98
B29	798.85	370.99

B30	1007.68	462.51	
B31	772.28	354.80	
B32	532.17	244.34	
B33	393.11	180.53	
B34	294.14	133.52	;

## PARAMETERS

HOURS(B) NUMBER OF HOURS IN EACH LOAD BLOCK

/ B1	36.935
B2	13.036
B3	23.899
B4	32.589
B5	58.661
B6	45.625
B7	73.869
B8	104.286
B9	108.631
B10	162.946
B11	223.780
B12	386.726
B13	410.625
B14	514.911
B15	660.476
B16	643.095
B17	491.012
B18	464.940
B19	441.042
B20	369.345
B21	341.101
B22	338.929
B23	334.583
B24	343.274
B25	360.655
B26	210.744
B27	282.440
B28	212.917
B29	212.917
B30	275.923
B31	217.262
B32	154.256
B33	117.321
B34	91.250 /;

## PARAMETERS

PRI(B) BASE PRICE (cent per kWh)

/ B1	6.55
B2	6.46
B3	6.42
B4	6.28
B5	6.23
B6	6.00
B7	5.92
B8	5.84
B9	5.76
B10	5.58
B11	5.43
B12	5.35
B13	5.15
B14	4.85
B15	4.43

B16	4.23
B17	4.15
B18	4.07
B19	4.06
B20	3.97
B21	3.66
B22	3.50
B23	3.28
B24	2.85
B25	2.65
B26	2.45
B27	1.87
B28	1.79
B29	1.62
B30	1.54
B31	1.46
B32	1.38
B33	1.21
B34	0.98 /;

## PARAMETERS

PRICE(N,B) PRICE AT EACH NODE IN EACH LOADBLOCK (cent per kwh);

PRICE('N1',B) = 1.75\*PRI(B);

PRICE('N3',B) = 2.5\*PRI(B);

## PARAMETERS

BETA(N) PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMANDS IN EACH BLOCK AT EACH NODE

IBETA(N,B) SLOPE IN INVERSE DEMAND FUNCTION IN EACH BLOCK AT EACH NODE

ALPHA(N,B) CONSTANTS FOR INVERSE DEMAND FUNCTION IN EACH BLOCK AT EACH  
NODE (\$M PER PWH);

BETA(N) \$d(n) = -0.3;

IBETA(N,B) \$d(n) = 1/BETA(N)\*PRICE(N,B)\*10/(ENERGY(B,N)/1000);

ALPHA(N,B) \$d(n) = PRICE(N,B)\*10-IBETA(N,B)\*ENERGY(B,N)/1000;



```

* ELEMENTS UNDERLYING SUPPLY AT EACH NODE
TABLE PDATA(P, LABELS) DATA FOR EACH OF THE GENERATING PLANTS
      UNITS AVAIL  GENMIN  GENMAX  FUELCOST  CAPCOST  LIFE
      *
      MW      MW      $-MWh    $M-MW    years
P1COAL1    2    1    286    635    14.8    1.2    30
P2COAL1    3    1    110    287    14.0    1.4    30
P3COAL1    4    1    176    635    14.3    1.3    30
P4GASOL    2    1    200    250    18.5    1.2    30
P5GASOC    6    1    0      999    32      0.5    30
P6GASCC    6    1    0      999    23.5    0.85   25
P7DIST     4    1    0      999    150     0.3    30
P8COAL1    2    1    275    634    12.1    1.45   30
P9COAL1    2    1    227    480    13.0    1.3    30
P10COAL1   2    1    250    634    12.2    1.4    30
P11COAL1   2    1    205    445    14.8    1.25   30
P12GASOL   2    1    200    250    18.5    0.8    30;

```

## SCALARS

```

RHO INTEREST RATE / 0.08 /
PRR PEAK RESERVE REQUIREMENT / 0.14 /

```

## PARAMETERS

```

PLANTCOST(P) FIXED ($M per GW) COSTS
OPCOST(P,B) VARIABLE ($M per GW) COSTS;
PLANTCOST(P) = (RHO/(1-(1+RHO)**(-PDATA(P,'LIFE'))))
               *PDATA(P,'CAPCOST')*1000;
OPCOST(P,B) = (PDATA(P,'FUELCOST'))/1000*HOURS(B);

```

```

* DISPLAY OPCOST, PLANTCOST;

```

## \* ELEMENTS UNDERLYING THE NETWORK

## PARAMETERS

```

R(N,NP) RESISTANCE ALONG LINE FROM NODE N TO NODE NP (OHMS)
X(N,NP) INDUCTANCE ALONG LINE FROM NODE N TO NODE NP (OHMS)
Y(N,NP) PARAMENTER IN KIRCHOFF EQUATON
G(N,NP) PARAMETER IN KIRCHOFF EQUATION;

```

## TABLE V(N,NP) VOLTAGE AMPLITUDE NODE N NODE NP (KV)

	N1	N2	N3	N4
N1	0	330	500	330
N2	330	0	330	0
N3	500	330	0	330
N4	330	0	330	0;

## TABLE NUMBER(N,NP) NUMBER OF POWERLINES BETWEEN NODES IN THE NETWORK

	N1	N2	N3	N4
N1	0	6	4	2
N2	6	0	5	0
N3	4	5	0	2
N4	2	0	2	0;

## TABLE DIST(N,NP) DISTANCE BETWEEN NODES IN THE NETWORK (KM)

	N1	N2	N3	N4
N1	0	150	375	150
N2	150	0	450	0
N3	375	450	0	400
N4	150	0	400	0;

TABLE RES(N,NP) RESISTANCE PER KM ALONG LINE FROM NODE N TO NODE NP (OHMS per KM)

	N1	N2	N3	N4
N1	0	0.03	0.025	0.03
N2	0.03	0	0.03	0
N3	0.025	0.03	0	0.03
N4	0.03	0	0.03	0;

TABLE IMPED(N,NP) IMPEDANCE PER KM OF ALONG LINE FROM NODE N TO NODE NP (OHMS per KM)

	N1	N2	N3	N4
N1	0	0.3	0.25	0.3
N2	0.3	0	0.3	0
N3	0.25	0.3	0	0.3
N4	0.3	0	0.3	0;

TABLE GRIDCAP(N,NP) ESTIMATED GRID CAPACITY IN THE NETWORK (MW)

	N1	N2	N3	N4
N1	0	3000	1500	1500
N2	3000	0	3000	0
N3	1500	3000	0	2000
N4	1500	0	2000	0 ;

$X(N,NP)\$lk(n,np) = IMPED(N,NP)*DIST(N,NP);$

$R(N,NP)\$lk(n,np) = RES(N,NP)*DIST(N,NP);$

$Y(N,NP)\$lk(n,np) = X(N,NP)/(SQR(R(N,NP))+SQR(X(N,NP)));$

$G(N,NP)\$lk(n,np) = R(N,NP)/(SQR(R(N,NP))+SQR(X(N,NP)));$

\* THE MODEL

POSITIVE VARIABLES

QS(N,B) ELECTRICITY SUPPLIED AT NODE N IN LOAD BLOCK B (GW)

QD(N,B) ELECTRICITY DEMANDED AT NODE N IN LOAD BLOCK B (PWH)

QGO(P,B) OUTPUT OF PLANT P IN LOAD BLOCK B (GW)

QGC(P) OPERATING CAPACITY OF EACH PLANT P (GW)

FREE VARIABLES

NSR NET SOCIAL WELFARE (\$M)

QP(N,NP,B) QUANTITY OF POWER FLOW AT EACH NODE IN EACH TIME BLOCK (GW)

THETA(N,B) VOLTAGE phase ANGLES (RADIAN);

EQUATIONS

OBJ NET SOCIAL WELFARE (\$M)

GENBAL(P,B) CAPACITY-OUTPUT BALANCE AT EACH GENERATOR IN EACH LOAD BLOCK(GW)

GMAXCAP(P) MAXIMUM CAPACITY CONSTRAINT FOR EACH PLANT(GW)

NODEBAL(N,B) SUPPLY BALANCE AT EACH GENERATING NODE(GW)

POWER(N,NP,B) POWER FLOW AT EACH NODE (GW)

FLOWBAL(N,B) POWER FLOW BALANCE(GW)

FLOWMAX(N,NP,B) MAXIMUM FLOW BETWEEN TWO NODES FOR EACH LOAD BLOCK(GW);

\*objective function

OBJ..

NSR =E= SUM((N,B)\$d(n), (ALPHA(N,B)\*QD(N,B)+0.5\*IBETA(N,B)\*(QD(N,B)\*\*2)))  
 - SUM((P,B), OPCOST(P,B)\*QGO(P,B))  
 - SUM((P), PLANTCOST(P)\*QGC(P));

\* IF THE PLANT IS SWITCHED ON, THE AMOUNT SUPPLIED IN EACH LOAD BLOCK EQUALS THE AMOUNT SWITCHED ON

GENBAL(P,B) ..

QGO(P,B) =L= QGC(P)\*PDATA(P, 'AVAIL');

\* THE OPERTING CAPACITY IS LESS THE THE UPPER BOUND ON GENERATION

GMAXCAP(P) ..

```

      QGC(P) =L= PDATA(P,'UNITS')*PDATA(P,'GENMAX')/1000;

* THE NODE SUPPLY = THE TOTAL OUTPUT OF ALL GENERATORS AT THE NODE
NODEBAL(N,B)$GR(N)..
      QS(N,B) =L= SUM(P$(NG(N,P)), QGO(P,B));

* GETTING AN EQUATION FOR POWER
POWER(N,NP,B)$LK(N,NP)..
      QP(N,NP,B)*1000
=E= G(N,NP)*(V(N,NP)**2-V(N,NP)*V(NP,N))
+Y(N,NP)*V(N,NP)*V(NP,N)*THETA(N,B)$NT(N)
-Y(N,NP)*V(N,NP)*V(NP,N)*THETA(NP,B)$NT(NP)
+0.5*G(N,NP)*V(N,NP)*V(NP,N)*(THETA(N,B)$NT(N))**2
-0.5*G(N,NP)*V(N,NP)*V(NP,N)*2*THETA(N,B)$NT(N)*THETA(NP,B)$NT(NP)
+0.5*G(N,NP)*V(N,NP)*V(NP,N)*(THETA(NP,B)$NT(NP))**2;

* NODE DEMAND = OWN NODE SUPPLY - POWER FLOW FROM AT NODE FROM OTHER NODES
* A POSITIVE POWER FLOW AT THE NODE IS A FLOW AWAY FROM THE NODE
* A NEGATIVE POWER FLOW AT THE NODE IS A FLOW INTO THE NODE
FLOWBAL(N,B)..
      QD(N,B)$d(n)*(1000/HOURS(B))
      =E= QS(N,B)$GR(N)
          - SUM(NP$lk(N,NP), NUMBER(N,NP)*QP(N,NP,B));

* NET FLOW ALONG LINK < MAXIMUM FLOW ALONG LINK
FLOWMAX(N,NP,B)$LK(N,NP)..
      NUMBER(N,NP)*QP(N,NP,B) =L= GRIDCAP(N,NP)/1000;

MODEL NETWORK /ALL/ ;

NETWORK.OPTFILE = 1 ;
* ABORT $(ALPHA("N1","B1") GT 0) "END";
SOLVE NETWORK MAXIMISING NSR USING NLP;

DISPLAY QD.L, QS.L, QGO.L, QGC.L, QP.L;
DISPLAY QD.M, QS.M, QGO.M, QGC.M, QP.M;
DISPLAY THETA.L;

```

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